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Abstract: The paper describes and analyses the role of civil society in five conflict 
cases – Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, Western Sahara and Israel/ 
Palestine. It evaluates the relative effectiveness of civil society organisations (CSOs) 
and assesses the potential and limits of CSO involvement in conflicts. In particular it 
concentrates on civil society activities in the fields of peace training and education, 
including formal and non-formal education, as well as research and media work. The 
research also identifies the obstacles that local third sector is faced with, examining 
experiences and lessons learned. The study then presents critical assessments of local 
CSO contributions to conflict transformation and concludes with a set of suggestions 
for local and mid-level civil society actors involved in these five conflict cases and 
beyond. This paper is an overview study, to provide ideas and documentation to the 
more detailed empirical research carried out in the context of the MICROCON Work 
Package ‘Conflict in the European Neighbourhood’.    
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Both the eastern and southern neighbourhoods of the EU are rife with unsettled 
conflicts. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of nationalist 
movements in the new independent states, several secessionist conflicts erupted. 
Violence, followed by population displacements and unsettled status questions 
characterize the conflicts in Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria. The peace 
processes in all three conflicts between the metropolitan states and the breakaway 
entities have been frozen by competing Western and Russian interests at top political 
and diplomatic levels. Turning south, the former Spanish colony of Western Sahara 
was divided in 1976 between Morocco and Mauritania. Mauritania later surrendered 
its claim in favour of Morocco, which annexed the entire territory and created mass 
displacement of Saharawi refugees, mostly to southern Algeria. The Polisario Front 
engaged in a guerrilla war against Morocco until the 1991 UN agreement to hold a 
referendum on the future of Western Sahara. To date, the referendum of the status of 
Western Sahara has not been held. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict instead, repeated 
attempts have been made to broker a two-state solution, which would entail the 
creation of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel. The direct negotiating 
parties are the Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 
but there are various domestic and international actors involved and most notably 
members of the Quartet, including the United States, Russia, the European Union and 
the United Nations.  
 
Negotiations in all these conflict cases were/are predominantly conducted by top-level 
actors. To date they have failed to reach tangible results. In this context this paper 
seeks to analyse: 
-  How civil society organizations (CSOs), as mid and grassroots actors, impact 
upon conflict dynamics?  
-  How effective are CSOs in conflict resolution efforts? 
To tackle these questions, this paper examines:  
-  What type of initiatives are undertaken by local CSOs in order to influence 
peace efforts?  
-  What is the interaction between CSOs with domestic governments and 
external donors?  
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-  What methods and tasks are used and undertaken by CSOs?  
-  What is the potential and the limitations of CSOs in conflict resolution efforts?  
 
These questions are addressed by combining a selective analysis of the documents and 
secondary literature on conflict resolution and transformation applied to the empirical 
cases of civil society engagement in Georgia/Abkhazia, Azerbaijan/Nagorno-
Karabakh/Armenia, Moldova/Transnistria, Morocco/Western Sahara and 
Israel/Palestine. The aim of this study is thus to describe and analyse the role of civil 
society in these five conflicts; evaluate the relative effectiveness of these actors and 
assess the potential and limits in CSO involvement in conflicts. It also aims at 
identifying the obstacles that local civil society is faced with, examining experiences 
and lessons learned. This paper is an overview study, to provide ideas and 
documentation to the more detailed empirical research carried out in the context of the 
MICROCON Work Package, ‘Conflict in the European Neighbourhood’.    
 
This paper is divided into theoretical and empirical sections. The theoretical part starts 
with a definition of civil society actors. It provides an overview of the concept of civil 
society, its functions, objectives, and its understandings in different contexts. The 
paper then analyses the specific role of third sector engagement in ethnic conflict, 
exploring its potential, limitations and effectiveness. It does so by engaging with 
conflict and peace theories, including the concepts of conflict prevention, 
peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-settlement reconciliation, conflict resolution and 
conflict transformation. The empirical part of the paper outlines general trends in civil 
society development in the metropolitan and secessionist states. It then provides an 
overview of CSOs by concentrating on the sub-sector of local NGOs. In particular it 
concentrates on civil society activities in the fields of peace training and education, 
including formal and non-formal education, as well as research and media work. The 
paper then presents critical assessments of local CSO contributions to conflict 
transformation and concludes with a set of suggestions for local and mid-level civil 







2. Civil society in democracy and peace 
 
Over the years, there has been a growing interest in the concept of civil society and its 
contribution to peace. There is no commonly agreed definition of what and who this 
sector actually includes however. According to the London School of Economics 
Centre for Civil Society, civil society ‘refers to the arena of uncoerced collective 
actions around shared interests, purposes and values… [It] commonly embraces a 
diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, 
autonomy and power…’
3 According to other experts, civil society includes all forms 
of voluntary activities and participation in different sectors of public life. For others 
still, the role of civil society is to interact with the political sphere, influence it and 
increase its responsiveness. More specifically for the purpose of this paper, this sector 
operates through diverse civil society organizations (CSOs). CSOs can be defined as 
the ‘wide area of non-governmental and not-for-profit organisation that have a 
presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, 
based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic 
considerations,’
4 and which try to prevent the state dominating society.
5  
 
Most definitions of civil society and CSOs are tightly interconnected with the concept 
of democracy. According to the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), 
civil society together with state and market is one of the three “spheres” that 
constitutes democratic societies.
6 Civil society does so by promoting democracy; 
seizing political initiatives and thus trying to enlarge the space for political 
participation.
7 In other words, civil society acts within the political space located 
between the state, political parties, and the economic and private spheres, that is a 
political space in which governance and development goals are contested. Civil 
society therefore interacts closely with the state,
8 even if independence from it is one 
of its main characteristics. Its crucial role is to influence the state and increase its 
effectiveness and responsiveness, but at the same time to limit itself to a “technical” 
                                                 
3 See London School of Economics Centre for Civil Society. 
4 See Document of the World Bank, (2006), Civil Society and Peacebuilding: Potentials, Limitation 
and critical Factors. 
5 See Gellner, E. (1995), The Importance of Being Modular, p. 32. 
6 See Rooy, A. Van (1998), Civil Society and the Aid Industry: The Politics and Promise, p. 19. 
7 See Hall, J. A. (1995), In Search of Civil Society, in J. A. Hall (ed.), Civil Society: Theory, History, 
Comparison, Polity Press, p. 1. 




9 Kumar defines civil society as part and parcel of democratic 
pluralism.
10 Likewise Bryant argues that civil society is an arena which grants 
possibilities of concerted action and social self-organization.
11 It involves citizens 
acting collectively in the public sphere to express their interests and ideas, achieve 
mutual goals, advance demands on the state and hold state officials accountable.
12 
Hence almost all agree that the main aim of civil society is to support democratic and 
pluralistic societies, create opportunities for public involvement and political 
participation and allow citizens to influence decision-making.  
 
2. 2. Civil society in conflict and peace  
 
2.2.1. Peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-settlement reconciliation 
 
Beyond promoting democratic governance, civil society can also play a potentially 
important role in conflict resolution. Conflicts tend to arise over non-negotiable 
disputes over the satisfaction of fundamental basic needs. Therefore conflict 
resolution means going beyond negotiating interests in order to meet all sides’ basic 
needs. Civil society actors can be instrumental in this respect. CSOs have access to 
the parties involved in conflict and the ability to bring parties to dialogue. They also 
induce local populations to get involved in long-term reconciliation efforts. By 
working directly with local populations on the ground, civil society is also able to 
assess the situation more effectively than top levels of governance or external actors.
13  
 
Civil society involvement in conflict and peace gained greater prominence since the 
Cold War, not least in view of the mushrooming of conflicts in this period.
14 Peace 
efforts may be divided according to the different stages of conflict, i.e., efforts and 
activities aimed at conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-
settlement reconciliation. Conflict prevention activities include early warning efforts, 
                                                 
9 See Dudouet, V. (2008), Civil society organisations in war-to-democracy transitions: From peace-
building to peace-sustaining roles, pp. 3-4. 
10 See Kumar, K. (1993), Civil Society: an Inquire into the Usefulness of a Historical term, p. 375. 
11 See Bryant, Ch. GA, (1993), Social Self-Organisation, Civility and Sociology: a Comment on 
Kumar’s Civil Society, p. 399. 
12 See Diamond, L. (1994), Rethinking Civil society: Toward Democratic Consolidation, p. 5. 
13 See Rupesinghe, K., Anderlini, S. N. (1998), Civil Wars, Civil Peace: An Introduction to Conflict 
Resolution, p. 70. 
14 See Paffenholz, T., Spurk, Ch. (2006), Civil Society, Civic Engagement, and Peacebuilding, Social 
Development Papers, Conflict Preventions and Reconstruction, p. 16.  
7 
 
violence prevention and the establishment of peace zones.
15 Peacemaking efforts 
include all those activities conducted to induce a ceasefire agreement and a thereafter 
a peace settlement between conflict parties. Article 33 of the UN Charter outlines the 
modes of peaceful third party action in this process, including ‘negotiation, enquiry, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, [and] resort to regional 
agencies or arrangements’. In addition, Articles 41 and 42 allow for sanctions, 
blockades, and violent intervention to induce an end of violence between warring 
parties and an ensuing peace agreement between them.
16 Peacekeeping activities 
include all those third party activities aimed at preventing a re-eruption of violence 
and the implementation of negotiated agreements. These range from civilian and 
military missions, humanitarian assistance, the monitoring of ceasefire agreements, 
and assisting ex-combatants in implementing peace agreements.
17 Post settlement 
reconciliation is a long-term process, achieved by fostering coexistence, mutual 
respect
18 and mutual forgiveness.
19  
 
Peace efforts can be conducted also within several broader frameworks of action, 
reflecting different approaches to the promotion of peace: conflict management, 
conflict resolution and conflict transformation. Conflict management approaches aim 
at the short-term management of armed conflict in ways that makes confrontation less 
damaging. Key actors in this phase are governments and multilateral organizations 
(mostly the UN), rather than civil society actors.
20 Conflict resolution instead aims at 
solving the causes of conflict and rebuilding relations between the parties not only at 
the top but also at mid- and grassroots levels of society. Mid-level civil society actors 
are particularly important in this respect to ensure influence is exerted on leaders.
21 
The principal instrument in conflict resolution is negotiation between conflict parties, 
whose aim is that of framing their understanding of the conflict differently so as to 
view it as a common or shared problem to be resolved.
22 It is a process of 
communication in which the disputants aim to influence each other by “sending a 
                                                 
15 See Maiese, M. (2003), Peacebuilding, Knowledge Base Essay. 
16 See United Nations, Charter of the United Nations: We the People of the United Nations... United for 
a Better World. 
17 See United Nations, Ibid.  
18 See Gutmann, A., Thomson, D. (2000), The Moral Foundations of Truth Commissions, pp. 22-24. 
19 See Shriver, D. W. (1995), An ethic for enmies: forgiveness in politics, pp. 329-31. 
20 See Deutsch, M. (1973), The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes. 
21 See Paffenholz, T. Spurk, Ch., (2006), p. 20. 




23 Fisher and Ury outline several objectives in conflict resolution 
negotiations: separating the people from the problem, focusing on interests, evaluating 
a variety of possibilities before deciding how to deal with issues; and insisting that 
results should be based on objective standards.
24  
 
In the negotiation process, three variables in Burton’s human needs theory must be 
taken into account: needs, values, and interests. According to Burton needs are 
universal human motivations conditioned by biology; values are ideas, customs and 
beliefs, characteristic of a particular community; and interests represent the 
aspirations of identity-based groups within a social system. Only interests can be 
negotiated through their re-articulation, while needs – such as recognition, identity, 
autonomy, belonging, security, and valued relations – must and can be pursued and 
achieved by all without the need for compromise. The human needs theory views 
analytical problem-solving workshops as the primary method for the conflict 
resolution. Key to this approach is the hypothesis that once relationships between 
disputants are analysed in depth, it is possible to reach solutions that are acceptable to 
all parties. The main goal of this theory is to reach a shared recognition of core needs 
by discovering shared objectives and finding ways to meet them through joint action. 
25 Conflict transformation goes a step further, aiming at changing or transforming 
relationships which gave rise to conflict in the first place, thus opening the way to 
genuine reconciliation.
26 This involves both altering the inter-subjective identities of 
conflict parties as well as the structural conditions underpinning violent, latent or 
frozen conflict (e.g., social injustice, unequal development, discrimination, etc). It 
thus focuses mainly on intra-society reconciliation by identifying mid-level groups 




2.2.2. Goals and functions of civil society in conflicts and peace 
     
                                                 
23 See Fisher, R. (1991), Negotiating Power: Getting and Using Influence, p. 128. 
24 See Fisher, R., Ury W. (1983), Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreements without Giving In, p. 11. 
25 See Burton, J. (1990), Conflict: Resolution and Prevention, p. 23-36. 
26 See Ross, M. H. (2000), Creating the conditions for peacemaking: theories of practice in ethnic 
conflict resolution, p. 1023. 
27 See Paffenholz, T., Spurk, Ch. (2006), p. 20.  
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In view of these differing approaches and the limited role foreseen for CSOs in 
conflict management, in what follows we concentrate principally on conflict 
resolution and transformation approaches. Under these approaches, peacebuilding is 
viewed as long-term process that includes direct or mediated interactions between 
conflict parties, in order to find negotiated agreements to the primary issues at stake.
28 
It also includes post-settlement peace consolidation aimed at a broader transition from 
negative to positive peace that leads to political pluralism, socio-economic justice and 
reconciliation.
29 This phase includes a wide range of activities: at grassroots level – 
community building, peace education, rehabilitation and public awareness work on 
human right protection and democratic values; at mid-range level – the promotion of a 
democratic culture, training for political organizations, training on conflict resolution, 
reconciliation workshops and socio-economic reconstruction.
30 The main task of 
peacebuilding is thus to achieve positive peace, a ‘stable social equilibrium in which 
the surfacing of new disputes does not escalate into violence and war.’
31 Particularly 
in the post-settlement phase, the focus lies principally on civil society. The Institute 
for Multi-Track Diplomacy sees the effort of this sector (track-two diplomacy) as 




In peacebuilding processes, CSOs engage in different types of activities and work 
with different sectors of society (from top-level decision-makers to grassroots 
communities).
33 These actors can carry out small-scale projects to strengthen 
grassroots civic culture,
34 ‘aim[ing] at overcoming revealed forms of direct, cultural 
and structural violence, transforming unjust social relationships and promoting 
conditions that can help to create cooperative relationships.’
35 They seek to ‘engage 
representative citizens from the conflicting parties in designing steps to be taken in the 
political arena to change perceptions and stereotypes, to create a sense that peace 
                                                 
28 See Darby, J., McGinty R., (eds.), (2000), The Management of Peace Processes, pp. 7-8. 
29 See Dudouet, V., (2008), p. 6. 
30 See Ropers, N. (1997), Roles and Functions of Third Parties in the Constructive Management of 
Ethnopolitical Conflicts, p. 26. 
31 See Haugerudbraaten, H., Peacebuilding: Six Dimensions and Two Concepts. 
32 See IMTD, IMTD’s philosophy, Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, 1998.  
33 See Chigas, D. (2007), Capacities and Limits of NGOs as Conflict Managers, p. 555. 
34 See Stephens, K. (1997), Building Peace in Deeply Rooted Conflicts: Exploring New Ideas to Shape 
the Future. 
35 See Bigdon, Ch., Korf, B. (2005), The Role of Development Aid in Conflict Transformation: 
Facilitating Empowerment Processes and Community Building.  
10 
 
might be possible, and to involve more and more of their compatriots.’
36 While being 
supported by foreign funds, genuine peacebuilding processes must be home-grown 
and cannot be imposed from outside.
37 The conflict transformation goals of civil 
society may be subdivided as follows:   
•  Developing a vision for a common future by engaging in public discussions 
about what kind of society and coexistence may be achieved; 
•  Facilitating dialogue between government leaders and civil society actors, 
which in turn help connect negotiations to the grassroots; 
•  Creating the scope for actual peace on the ground – expanding peace-building 
processes at local level to ensure an actual implementation of agreements 
signed by leaders and ensuing social reconciliation; 
•  Ensuring public participation and ownership of peace processes.
38 
 
To achieve these goals, CSOs and in particular human rights organisations, advocacy 
groups, peace networks, women and youth groups, professional associations, trade 
unions, community-based organizations, academic institutions and think tanks, and 
independent media and journalist associations carry out several functions.
  These 
include: 
•  Protection – protecting civilian rights against abuses by state structures; 
contributing to demobilization, disarmament or reintegration of ex-
combatants; 
•  Intermediation and facilitation between the state and its citizens to ensure a 
balance between official structures and social networks; in peacebuilding 
processes intermediation takes place also between conflict parties; 
•  Monitoring official practices and structures, and the situation on the ground;
39   
•  Socialization – socializing and training citizens into expressing their 
democratic rights; fostering democratic attitudes and practices among citizens 
through dialogue projects, peace education, exchange programmes, peace 
camps, and joint cultural events;  
                                                 
36 See Chigas, D. (2007), p. 559. 
37 See Maiese, M. (2003). 
38 See Barnes, C., Civil Society Roles in Working with Conflict and Building Peace. 
39 See Document of the World Bank, (2006).   
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•  Advocacy and public communication – defending interests, especially of 
marginalized groups, and bringing their problems on the public and peace 
agendas by advancing recommendations to decision-makers;
40  
 
2.3. NGOs as CSOs in conflict transformation 
 
2.3.1. Value added and activities 
 
Within the broad spectrum of CSOs involved in conflict and peace, a critical role is 
played by NGOs. Also here, there is no generally accepted definition of what and who 
constitutes an NGO. Generally NGOs are defined as private, self-governing, not-for-
profit institutions working on political, social, economic, human rights, and conflict 
resolution issues.
41 Their members are usually individuals from private associations 
rather than governmental officials.
42 Paffenholz and Spurk argue that advocacy and 
public diplomacy are the main functions of NGOs, which they define as bringing 
issues relevant to the people on the political agenda through public campaigns or 
inducing civil society involvement in peace-building.
43 Local NGOs are key in this 
respect, in so far as they know the country well, including its local institutions and 
political culture.
44 Local NGOs can also: 
-  operate free from constraints of narrow diplomatic mandates and foreign-
policy imperatives, focus on a long term issues which governments are unable 
and unwilling to do,
45 and enjoy lower political risks in case of failure,
46 
-  operate in confidentiality without excessive media and official presence,
47 
-  access areas, actors and constituencies inaccessible to official actors. Talk to 
all parties without losing face and provide a neutral forum for dialogue.
48 This 
                                                 
40 See Paffenholz, T., Spurk, Ch. (2006), pp. 8-13. 
41 See Aall, P. (2001), What do NGOs: Bring to Peacemaking?, p. 367. 
42 See Jacobson, H. K. (1984), Networks of Interdependence: International Organisations and the 
Global Political System, p. 4. 
43 See Dudouet, V. (2008), p. 4. 
44 See Aall, P. (1996), Nongovernmental Organizations and Peacemaking, p. 443. 
45 See Tongeren, P. van. (1998), Exploring the Local Capacity for Peace – The Role of NGOs, p. 23 
46 See Neubert, D. (2004), The ‘Peacemakers’ Dilemma: The Role of NGOs in Process of Peace-
building in Decentralised Conflicts, p. 61. 
47 See Fischer, M. (2006), Civil Society in Conflict Transformation: Ambivalence, Potentials and 
Challenges, p. 9. 
48 See Bakker, E. (2001), Early Warning by NGOs in Conflict Areas, p. 269.  
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includes talking to actors viewed as illegitimate or illegal by official 
institutions,
49 
-  use access to the international community to increase its involvement in 
peacebuilding, 
-  interact and thus effectively represent grassroots interests and desires, 
mobilize public opinion, and create networks between civil society actors in 
conflict zones to galvanize political will at top political levels, 
-  raise awareness and incentives for peaceful coexistence by facilitating 
communication and building inter-communal relationships, changing values, 
re-evaluating historical narratives, eroding myths of the other party’s 
resistance to peace,
50 and enemy images, 
-  create spaces for informal dialogue and facilitate official negotiations by 
providing technical and political assistance. When official talks fail, NGOs 
can continue dialogue and negotiations to generate new initiatives and 
maintain momentum,
51 
-  generate know-how and ideas by offering in-depth information of the situation 
on the ground as well as on the experiences of other peace processes. 
 
To capitalize on these potential assets, NGOs carry out several activities. These 
include problem-solving workshops, conflict-resolution training and capacity-
building, truth and reconciliation commissions and other grassroots initiatives. 
Problem-solving workshops, undertaken in the tradition of conflict resolution, aim at 
reframing the conflict in order to yield win-win solutions. NGOs assist the parties in 
redefining their differences in terms of a problem to be resolved – rather than an 
incompatibility of subject positions – thus generating a mutually acceptable settlement 
for both sides.
52 Kelman notes that workshops can create a more differentiated image 
of the “enemy” and help the disputants discover potential negotiating partners on the 
other side.
53 The scope is also the encouragement and empowerment of young people 
to develop critical judgement and conflict management skills, by improving 
                                                 
49 See Chigas, D. (2007), p. 561. 
50 See Peace Research Institute in the Middle East, Summary of PRIME Study of NGOs (2000/2001). 
51 See Rupesinghe, K., Anderlini, S. N. (1998), p. 111. 
52 See Baruch Bush, R. A., Folger, J. P. (1994), The Promise of Mediation: Responding to Conflict 
Through Empowerment and Recognition, p. 56. 
53 See Kelman, H. C. (1990), Applying a human needs perspective to the practice of conflict resolution: 
The Israeli-Palestinian case, p. 189.  
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communication and interaction skills, an ability to analyse the conflict and transform 
it.
54 In this case the disputants are brought together in their personal capacities, rather 




Another approach to peace building is conflict-resolution training and capacity-
building. Conflict-resolution training helps people develop knowledge and skills 
related to conflict resolution and transformation. It creates spaces for marginalized 
groups and assists in building relationships among divided communities.
56 Training 
changes the way that confronted parties view their conflict situation. It gives 
participants better skills in communication and negotiation, and makes them less 
susceptible to manipulation. Trainings can make use of several interactive modes, 
such as case studies, simulations, and discussion.
57 However in these meetings or 
trainings often participants tend to already have rather “moderate” views and it is 
difficult to include individuals on the “extremes” whose inclusion is critical to conflict 
resolution.
58 Capacity-building generally includes the provision of technical and 
logistical assistance for mediation efforts to the relevant actors as well as the 
enhancement of civil servants’ skills in negotiations.
59 
 
Truth and reconciliation commissions instead are established to complement the 
negotiation efforts of official actors. They are generally considered to be “bodies set 
up to investigate a past history of violations of human rights in a particular country – 
which can include violations by the military or other government forces or armed 
opposition forces”.
60 Such commissions do not have the power to punish but to 
promote reconciliation and provide more comfortable environment for victims. Truth 
and reconciliation commissions have greater access to top-level actors and increased 
assurance that its findings will be taken under serious consideration. Mid-level actors 
                                                 
54 See Schell-Faucon, S. (2001), Conflict Transformation through Educational and Youth Programmes. 
55 See Chigas, D. (2007), p. 557. 
56 See Spangler, B. (2003), Problem-Solving Mediation. Beyond Intractability.  
57 See Babbitt, E. F. (1997), Contributions of Training to International Conflict Resolution, pp. 365-
387. 
58 See Chigas, D. (2007), p. 575. 
59 See Rupesinghe, K., Anderlini, S. N. (1998), pp. 130-131. 
60 See Hayner, P. B. (1994), Fifteen Truth Commissions – 1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study, p. 558.  
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involved in these activities are often able to use their personal or institutional 
connections to move towards conflict transformation.
61  
 
While top-down approaches are decisive, peace must also be built from the bottom up. 
And in this respect mid-range CSOs display far more flexibility than top-level 
authorities, because they have access to the grassroots as well as to governmental 
leaders.
62 For precisely this reason some view CSOs as more suitable mediators than 
official governments.
63 Mid-range actors engaging at grassroots level seek to 
empower local communities to make decisions and formulate their own goals in 
conflict resolution
64 and to strengthen their capacity to address these goals and 
needs.
65 It is important that all groups, including the marginalized, should be involved 
in this process (but the participation of grassroots actors in these activities is limited 
or non-existent).
66 However effective peacebuilding requires the coordination between 
actors at all levels, including also between mid- and top-level actors. 
 
2.3.2. Limitations of Civil Society Organizations 
 
The civil society sector plays a critical and perhaps also decisive role in conflict 
resolution, but there are several criticisms and limitations of CSOs and their activities: 
•  CSOs are not always fully independent and may partly represent state interests 
or may be reluctant to criticize fully government policy openly; 
•  local CSOs often have a weak membership base and lack country-wide 
political or ethnic representation and thus at times reach only a limited number 
of people;
67 
•  local NGOs operating without Western funds are generally less developed and 
have less institutional capacity
68 than those with external support and thus 
have a low level of sustainability; 
                                                 
61 See Lederach, J. P. (1997), Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, pp. 47-
51. 
62 See Ibid. (1997), p. 94. 
63 See Connie, P. (1998), Sustainable Peace: The Role of the UN and Regional Organisations in 
Preventing Conflicts. 
64 See Boyce, W. Koros, M., and Hodgson, J., Community Based Rehabilitation: A Strategy for 
Peacebuilding, p. 5. 
65 See Erasmus, V. (2001), Relief Aid and Development Cooperation: Community Mobilization as a 
Tool for Peacebuilding, p. 247. 
66 See Pugh, M. Post-Conflict Rehabilitation: The Humanitarian Dimension. 
67 See Paffenholz, T., Spurk, Ch. (2006).  
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•  not all CSOs respect values of internal democracy, transparency and 
accountability thus hindering their external legitimacy;
69 
•  at times the civil society dimension is marked by weak networking and lack of 
coordination; 
•  CSOs generally do not have the capacity and power to change political 
incentives. They can only encourage resolution initiatives.
70 Their activities 
may be effective in conducting dialogue, but do not have the necessary 
political resources to bring about change.
71 In view of this lack of power 
political influence, often CSOs limit themselves to the role of consultants.
72 
 
3. Civil society in five conflict cases: an overview 
 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, civil society had a hard time to emerge and 
consolidate, in so far as Soviet people had no experience in creating civic institutions. 
The third sector in Georgia started developing in the 1990s, yet it soon proved its 
strength with the Rose Revolution, in which it exerted considerable influence. This 
sector created a legal basis for the revolution by exposing mass fraud during the 
November 2003 parliamentary elections and then mobilizing public participation and 
protest.
73 Likewise civil society is one of the main players in Abkhazia alongside the 
de facto Abkhaz government. But there is a great imbalance between Georgian and 
Abkhaz civil societies. The war between the two had a considerable impact on the 
nature and trends in the development of Abkhaz civil society. The ensuing “no war no 
peace” situation; economic isolation caused by the decision to impose CIS 
(Commonwealth of Independent States) economic sanctions in January 1996 (a 
decision reversed with Russia’s recognition of Abkhaz independence in 2008); the 
information blockade, driven by limited access to global technologies and networks; 
uncertainty and low expectations for the future, generating apathy and passivity; and 
finally chronic stress and fear of renewed military action, have all contributed to 
hindering the development of Abkhaz civil society. However the ruling political 
                                                                                                                                            
68 See Fischer, M. (2006). 
69 See Document of the World Bank (2005d), Engaging Civil Society Organisations on Conflict-
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70 See Chigas, D. (2007), p. 575. 
71 See Tongeren, P. van. (1998), p. 22. 
72 See Fisher, R. J. (1972), Third Party Consultation: A Method for the Study and Resolution of 
Conflict, pp. 67-94. 
73 See Nodia, G. (2005), Civil Society Development in Georgia: Achievements and Challenges.  
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leadership of Abkhazia tends to be tolerant and supportive of civil society activism. In 
Georgia the political situation is more favourable to civil society’s democratic 
initiatives.
74 In Georgia civil society has received far greater external support than its 
counterpart in Abkhazia. Over the years numerous external foundations assisted the 
democratic transition process in Georgia through different development projects. The 
same was not done in Abkhazia, not least in view of legal complications (i.e., status 
questions). Further reasons for the poor development of civil society in Abkhazia 
relate to the lack of experience and the low level of intra-civil society interactions in 
Abkhazia. 
 
Civil society organizations in Azerbaijan and in Armenia as in Georgia emerged in the 
mid 1990s. Considerable input was put by international and mostly Western 
foundations which were concentrated on democracy promotion in the post-Soviet 
space. Despite this Western engagement, a lack of civic activism is widespread among 
Azerbaijani society and political participation is quite limited, with an ineffective 
outreach by local CSOs to the general population. In addition, CSOs are not 
sufficiently diversified: the organizations with the largest membership bases include 
trade unions and educational organizations; research centres are poorly developed and 
lack professionalism. Other challenges facing Azerbaijani civil society are: low level 
of cooperation among CSOs; lack of interpersonal trust; weak international linkages 
(marking a difference with Georgia, where CSOs are far more internationalized); and 
local funds for their development are insignificant. The relationships with official 
structures are less developed, therefore civil society is not influential within the 
ongoing political processes and mostly acts as a passive observer; over time 
Azerbaijani civil society has developed its own self-censorship mechanisms and tries 
to avoid criticizing state elites.
75 The long lasting ethno-political conflict between 
Azerbaijan and Armenia with territorial claims which resulted in the Armenian 
occupation of about 20% of Azerbaijan’s territory, including Nagorno-Karabakh and 
seven adjacent districts (rayons) and about one million internationally displaced 
people has impacted upon the development of civil society in Nagorno-Karabakh, 
where it had little chance to emerge. Karbakh was and remains closed to international 
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organizations. Besides, it is one of the world’s most militarized places. Despite these 
circumstances some CSOs do operate, but their influence on the authorities, including 
both Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, is insignificant.  
 
In Armenia civil society is relatively more active. Domestic CSOs are active in 
designing programmes on issues such as democracy building, humanitarian 
assistance, healthcare, and trafficking. In these spheres they have gained recognition 
from the wider society. However their effectiveness in influencing government policy 
is limited, as the level of public participation in their activities is low. Their scarce 
influence on official authorities was proved also during the last presidential election 
of 2008, when the view of civil society activists had little bearing on the electoral 
campaign and results.
76 Armenian trade unions also play a limited role in political life, 
whereas business associations seem to be more active. The main problem facing the 
third sector in Armenia is related to financing questions, as civil society remains 
dependent on foreign donors or Diaspora funding.
77  
 
Likewise in Moldova, the civic activism and political participation in order to hold 
political leaderships accountable and demand greater government responsiveness are 
also low. Therefore the influence of civil society on political life is limited and lacks 
institutional capacity. At the beginning of the 2000s, Moldovan officials tried to 
marginalize this sector by establishing government-sponsored organizations as a 
counterweight to opposition CSOs.
78 Today, official Moldova seeks European 
integration and therefore tries to improve its relations with the third sector and 
cooperate with it on democracy and conflict resolution issues. In 2005 the Parliament 
presented a draft Concept on Cooperation between the Parliament of Moldova and 
Civil Society, which aimed at increasing collaboration in the early stages of 
lawmaking. Alongside this, external factors like the EU-Moldova Action Plan, the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Threshold Programme, and the Moldova-
NATO Individual Plan triggered greater civil society involvement in decision-making, 
although this instances of cooperation remain limited and unsatisfactory.
79 On the 
other side of the conflict divide Transnistria suffers from autocratic governance, 
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isolation, economic underdevelopment and organized crime.
80 CSOs in Transnistria 
began their activities in the mid-1990s with the creation of movements in defence of 
the Transnistrian region, so-called “ultra-patriotic” organizations in favour of 
independence.
81 Most of them were controlled by the MGB (a structure identical to 
the former KGB). In the early 2000s some local CSOs began to work on the 
promotion of democratic ideas and values, but they were restricted by the 
authoritarian regime. Local secret structures in general have tried to create obstacles 
for civil activism.
82 The Moldovan government is aware of these problems and is 
interested in the development of Transnistrian civil society; however it is against of 
any form of external involvement in this process, concerned that it would imply some 
form of international recognition of this region. 
 
Civil society in Morocco has existed in different forms since independence, but it is 
only in the 1980s and 1990s that, along with economic liberalization, it evolved and 
reached its current structure.
83 Today, there are several associations that are different 
in their aims and fields of action: economic development, human rights, women rights 
and the fight against corruption.
 84 However, civil society organizations (CSOs) are 
often perceived as “potential competitors” by political actors, who usually try to either 
exploit or undermine their capacities, by getting involved in their structures or linking 
them to political parties.
85 The King’s attitude towards CSOs is mixed, depending on 
the kind of decision he has to take: in some cases the King has opted for the building 
of a broader consensus through an active participation of civil society; in other 
occasions he has completely excluded any involvement of these organizations.
86 In 
recent years, the government of Morocco has adopted a number of reforms in the area 
of freedom of association and assembly. According to the European Commission, 
these changes ‘have led to the emergence of a more active and dynamic civil 
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87 However, ‘civil society organisations have been successful in bringing 
about change only when they have worked towards goals supported by the palace’.
88 
There are also regulations restricting the freedom of the media, which is under the 
Ministry of the Interior and the Prime Minister’s control. They have the power to 
suspend a publication if it is considered harmful to Islam, the monarchy, territorial 
integrity or public order, and the authors may incur fines or even be punished with 
detention.
89 In the last decade, a Sahrawi civil society in the occupied territories of 
Western Sahara has emerged. The starting point of the civil society movement is 
considered to be the student demonstration outside the administrative buildings in 
Laayoune in September 1999.
90 A new wave of intense protests, quickly baptised by 
the Polisario Front and its European support network as the “Sahrawi Intifada”, 
erupted in 2005.
91 Moroccan authorities imposed heavy limitations on the freedom of 
expression and association in the occupied territories of the Western Sahara. Only in a 
few cases, such as protests over economic issues and human rights advocacy, some 
form of open activity by Sahrawi groupings has been allowed by the Moroccan 
regime.
92 At present, there are tensions within Sahrawi civil society between those 
activists that would like to continue with the current strategy focused on civil rights 
and those who call for a stronger and more politicized pro-independence protest.
93 
Since 1975, Morocco has maintained a stringent control over the flow of information 
to and from Western Sahara, and restricting media access to the occupied territories. 
In the absence of free media, Sahrawi activists have extensively used alternative 




Civil society emerged in Israel only in the 1970s, in so far as the first two decades of 
the state’s life were focused on centralization and collectivism.
95 In the late 1980s and 
in the 1990s, along with economic liberalization and the outbreak of first Intifada, 
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many associations flourished in Israel, promoting different values and needs: not only 
peace, but also civil rights and topics that were new to the Israeli public discourse 
(non-discrimination, the environment, etc).
96 Especially during the Oslo process, 
different groups for and against the conclusion of a peace agreement with the 
Palestinians were particularly active in Israel.
97 The Oslo process also led to the 
creation of a trans-national civil society, promoting the participation of other 
institutions outside the State of Israel.
98 When the second Intifada broke out in 2000, 
the Israeli state carried on the liberalization process, even counting on the thriving 
activity of local NGOs, which sometimes even substituted the state in important fields 
such as that of welfare.
99 This decentralization process provided also an opportunity 
for the Arabs within the state of Israel to take part in public discourse through the 
action of Arab NGOs and Arab civil society groups. Initially focussed on immediate 
basic needs (e.g., land expropriation), these groups have become increasingly active 
against the state’s political, economic and social marginalization and discrimination 
against the Palestinian minority, by establishing alternative institutions and providing 
alternative services, approaching according to some a “state-within-a-state 
arrangement”.
100 At present, Israeli civil society is divided along identity and 
ideological lines: on the one hand, there are exponents that sustain cultural pluralism 
and openness (including both Jewish Israeli and Palestinian Israeli groups); on the 
other hand, there are advocates of an exclusivist identity.
101 This tendency makes civil 
society in Israel weak and not as active as in the past, leaving room for a stronger 
engagement of the military society, that has been increasingly empowered to 
influence the ongoing conflict.
102 
 
Palestinian civil society is an atypical one, since it emerged and developed in the 
absence of a state.
103 Before the State of Israel was established, Palestinian civil 
society was mainly organized through charitable associations. Along with the birth of 
the State of Israel, there was a dispersion of Palestinians and thus of activists: those 
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who lived in Israel worked for the preservation of their national identity, while those 
living in Arab countries joined local parties and NGOs.
104 In the 1960s two major 
events led to a new flourishing of Palestinian civil society: first the emergence of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization; second, the occupation by Israel of East Jerusalem, 
the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heighs and the Sinai in 1967. The PLO 
supported youth and women organizations and the activities in this period were 
mainly focused on basic assistance and relief.
105 An important change in Palestinian 
civil society occurred in 1988 with the outbreak of the first Intifada, which led to the 
convergence between the national liberation and the socio-economic agenda.
106 
During the Oslo years, Palestinian civil society benefited from international attention 
and funding, above all focusing on activities linked to supporting the Oslo process. 
The establishment of the Palestinian National Authority also had a great impact on the 
civil society realm: on the one hand, the PNA established strong connections with 
CSOs; on the other, the PNA and CSOs became competitors in representing the 
Palestinian population and gathering external financial support. In 2000 a new law 
was approved – the “Law of Charitable Societies and Domestic Commissions” – 
establishing the right of NGOs to work via registration and not by permit.
107 At 
present, Palestinian CSOs fall within five main categories: political groups, voluntary 
cooperatives, mass voluntary organizations, trade unions and Islamic charity group.
108 
However, the flourishing of local NGOs came to a halt with the explosion of the 
second Intifada in 2000. Over the course of the second Intifada and as epitomized by 
the success of Hamas in the 2006 elections, the role of Islamic CSOs has grown 
significantly. 
 
3.1. CSO involvement in the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict 
 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western actors began focusing on the 
development of the CSO sector in Georgia. In the years of independence the number 
of CSOs reached several hundred, and was generally involved in advocating 
democracy and monitoring human rights, promoting conflict resolution and civic 
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education. Some of the most important CSOs gained public recognition and political 
influence. These organizations are mostly Tbilisi-based NGOs and foreign funds 
remain critical to their activities. There is however a great imbalance between the 
number and level of development of CSOs in the capital and in provinces. The 
Samegrelo region is the only exception, which may be explained by the concentration 
of international donors near the Abkhaz conflict zone. 
 
Beginning with the work of NGOs, the sustainability of NGOs in Georgia rose in the 
run-up and during the Rose Revolution, but has decreased since then. Many NGOs 
lost their distinct identity as they moved into government structures; many either have 
remained financially unstable or have depended excessively on foreign funds; the civil 
society sphere remains poorly coordinated and NGO  interactions with the media has 
decreased impinging negatively upon the public resonance of these organizations; the 
centre-periphery gap in NGO development has also widened; newly established 
NGOs find it difficult to attract foreign funds and survive, while developed 
organizations have difficulties in retaining or finding qualified employees. 
Furthermore only some NGOs can provide full-time salaries for their staff and 
therefore staff members have more than one job. Consequently these persons are not 
fully engaged in their work. The same applies also to Abkhaz civil society activists.  
 
All these factors impede NGOs to identify long-term projects and conduct strategic 
planning. Officials tend to constrain NGO watchdog functions. By contrast however, 
since the revolution the legal framework governing civil society organizations has 
improved and become supportive, by providing tax benefits and simplifying 
registration procedures that allow NGOs to operate freely. The law however does not 
include a mechanism for the State to provide funds to NGOs. Cooperation between 
the government and civil society is limited and the level of NGOs influencing official 
policy regarding conflict resolution issues (and not only) is low. Furthermore the 
interaction between officials and NGO activists largely depend on personal 
relationships and access to the ruling political leadership. From the government side, 
relations with civil society actors are also based on personal preferences. The  
23 
 
mechanisms and possibilities of NGOs to integrate society in policy debates and 
conflict resolution process are thus quite limited.
109 
 
In Abkhazia NGOs have been more isolated and this has impacted negatively on their 
engagement in civic peace initiatives with Georgian counterparts. There are about 200 
NGOs registered in Abkhazia, but only 30 have regular ongoing projects and 
activities. In the Gali district a community of young NGO activists is working, serving 
as a bridge between Zugdidi and Sukhumi.
110 In most cases such organizations were 
created by the people affected by the conflict. These were local academics, teachers or 
journalists who engaged in peacebuilding initiatives, including humanitarian and 
trauma healing activities, human rights monitoring, arranging meetings between the 
confronted parties, elaborating programmes focused on the reintegration of ex-
combatants in society, etc.
111 These activities have changed over time reflecting 
changing political dynamics on both sides. Most of these peace activities have been 
financed by foreign funds, although international foundations finance only 
Georgian/Abkhaz common projects and not initiatives by the Abkhaz side alone. 
 
After the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict, a wide range of bi-communal and international 
civic peace activities were carried out. INGOs (International Non-Governmental 
Organizations) like International Alert (IA), Links, the Berghof Centre for 
Constructive Conflict Management and Conciliation Resources, as well as academics 
from the University of California, Irvine (UCI) and the Vrije Universiteit Brussel 
(VUB), have organized meetings, workshops, and trainings between confronted 
parties in order to foster dialogue. The main scope of such initiatives was generally to 
break down stereotypes among the people affected by conflict, stereotypes which are 
rooted since the Soviet past and reinforced by parental and social education in the 
current context. The topics of dialogue have been diverse, including current proposals 
from the official negotiating track (focused mainly on the status question), transition 
processes in multinational societies, the building of democratic institutions and good 
governance, international standards in human and minority rights, and positive 
examples of resolving ethno-political conflicts elsewhere.
112 In the framework of 
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these activities civic actors from Georgia and Abkhazia participated in a study visit to 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland to examine political, security, and economic 
aspects of the Northern Ireland peace process and the participation of civil society in 
peace initiatives.
113 Generally these projects have included interactions between mid-
range civil society actors. The impact of these initiatives has been limited. On the one 
hand, while being well connected to foreign donors, these local NGOs have had a 
limited outreach to the grassroots. Interactions with local communities have either not 
taken place of the people involved in wider outreach activities have been limited. On 
the other hand, the impact on track-one diplomacy has also been small. The lack of 
public debate about progress in the negotiations and discussions of possible 
compromises (from both sides) suggest that officials and civil society on the one side, 
and civil society and grassroots actors on the other have been divorced from one 
another. In other words, these mid-range initiatives have failed to ensure links and 
communications between top and grassroots levels. 
 
Other areas of NGO activism related to the conflict have included work on IDPs 
(Internally Displaced Persons), youth, and humanitarian and psycho-rehabilitation. 
For Georgian civil society actors the crucial issue has been the question of the right of 
refugees to return to their homes. Several NGOs work in this field. ‘Assist Yourself’ 
researches into the social situation of the IDP community in Tbilisi and lobbies their 
case to the government in Georgia. In the framework of these activities, it has drawn 
up an information pack about the rights of refugees.
114 CIPDD (Caucasus Institute for 
Peace, Democracy and Development) has implemented a project called “South 
Caucasus experts’ network for IDP-s return/restitution issues policy”.
115 The NGO 
“Ojakh” carries out “Peacemaking School” that aims to strengthen the peacemaking 
organizational potential of young leaders in the refugee/IDP communities through the 
South Caucasus Network of NGOs. Their other ongoing project “Peacemaking Ways 
to Bring Together the Peoples of the Caucasus” is focused on reducing distrust and 
tension in relation to the refugee/IDP issues in the South Caucasus, bringing together 
peoples and inducing the participation of IDPs and refugees in peacemaking 
processes. “Ojakh” also researches the actual problems facing refugees/IDPs in 
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Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia.
116 A women NGO – Cultural and Humanitarian 
Fund “Sukhumi” also works on the IDP question. Its members are women IDP from 
Abkhazia from various professions: teachers, economists, doctors, lawyers, journalists 
and housewives. This organization deals with economic education and small business 
development, women rights protection, people’s diplomacy, and social psycho-
rehabilitation. With the support of UNV (United Nations Volunteers), the Danish 
Refugee Council and the UK Embassy it has carried out meetings with women from 
“the other side of the conflict”, to elaborate joint business projects and discuss the 
peaceful settlement of the conflict.
117  
 
Youth involvement in peace activities is essential, as youth is less vulnerable to 
entrenched political views than older generations. The UMCOR (United Methodist 
Committee on Relief) Youth House in Tbilisi and UMCOR Youth House in Sokhumi 
carried out a programme on Youth Leadership Skills Development in Conflict 
Prevention. The participants were young people who suffered as a direct consequence 
of the violent conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia. This included war victims in 
Abkhazia and IDPs in Georgia. The main objectives of the project were to promote 
peace and understanding between the peoples and to develop conflict resolution and 
prevention skills of Abkhazian and Georgian youth. This organization arranged also 
Summer Camps in Likani (Georgia) and Pitsunda (Abkhazia).
118 The Georgian 
refugee-organization ‘Association of Displaced Women  from Abkhazia’ under the 
direction of a Bulgarian NGO also carried out a youth project, in the framework of 
which children from both sides of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict were invited to a 
summer camp in Bulgaria in 1996.
119 The Centre for Change and Conflict 
Management PARTNERS-GEORGIA with Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and United 
Nations of Georgia (UNAG) implemented the project “Building for the Future”. The 
main objective of the programme was to engage youth in building democracy in 
Georgia including in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The function of Partners-Georgia 
in this project was to develop skills for youth groups, actively participating in summer 
camps and organizing training for peer trainers.
120 ‘Civic Initiative – Man of Future 
Foundation’ and ‘Samursakan’ instead promote young researchers in Abkhazia who 
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work on ethnic conflict issues. The level of the participation of youth in the activities 
of the third sector in Abkhazia is very low. It is connected partly with absence of 
organizational skills and the lack of capacity in applying for foreign funds.
121 The 
organizations do not have a permanent staff and mainly consist on young volunteers. 
These are however some youth initiatives focusing on human rights monitoring, 
democracy, mass media and education issues.
122 In the Gali district there is also the 
Daily Human Rights Youth Club. 
 
Turning instead to CSOs working on humanitarian issues, we note how these 
generally attempt to take a neutral or even apolitical stance in the conflict,
123 defining 
their role as promoters of the basic rights of people. The task of such organizations is 
to gather information, visit vulnerable areas as observers, interview local community 
groups in order to gain spread awareness of cases of political and economic 
repression.
124 There are number of humanitarian CSOs in Georgia and Abkhazia 
which deal with issues such as hunger, rehabilitation and tuberculoses. Most of their 
activities in this field are financed by foreign donors. The ‘Centre for Humanitarian 
Programmes’ is the most developed CSO in Abkhazia. Its fields of activities are: (1) 
providing emergency aid to the victims of the war, (2) trauma healing work for war-
affected people, (3) production of audio-visual archives to document the 
Georgian/Abkhaz conflict, (4) capacity-building among local NGOs, (5) reintegration 
of ex-combatants. The Centre arranges trainings, seminars and workshops with 
foreign partners and co-organized the summer camp for Abkhaz and Georgian IDP 
children. It is engaged in several parallel projects with its Georgian counterparts.   
 
Research foundations and the academic community can also make a valuable 
contribution to the theoretical discourse regarding the nature of internal conflicts and 
reasons why some conflicts escalate into war. Such communities can be involved in 
monitoring activities to provide key insights into the motivations, interests and beliefs 
of each party. They can also create opportunities for cross community exchanges and 
educational programmes.
125 Georgian research institutes publish extensively on 
conflict issues, although they are sometimes focused more on providing a historical 
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justification for claims of different sides than on policy-oriented questions. Since 
1997 the ICCN (International Centre on Conflict and Negotiation) initiated a scientific 
project called “The Network for Early Warning and Monitoring of Ethnic, Social and 
Religious Conflicts in Georgia.” The main objectives of this research were to study 
the current situation in the conflict zones and prepare appropriate recommendations 
for the confronted parties. The ICCN also published several books about conflicts and 
conflict management in the South Caucasus. On the Abkhaz side we find the 
Foundation for Citizens’ Initiative and Future of Humankind in Sokhumi and the 
Center for Development of a Civil Society in Gagra. Both organizations research the 
settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, human rights, youth politics and 
democracy; they carry out programmes for students in secondary schools and 
universities. The sociological research group of the Civic Initiative Foundation has 
undertaken a survey among residents of the Gali region regarding their views on the 
resolution of the conflict. However, publications are often impeded when research 
results do not conform to the political positions of the political leadership.
126 
Generally the ability of these Georgian and Abkhaz organizations to provide 
empirically-grounded research and research-informed recommendations is limited and 
often published material is unequivocally one-sided. 
 
The media can also play a pivotal role in conflict contexts. It is an effective vehicle to 
disseminate analysis of political changes and ideas, it can communicate negotiating 
signals and interests between confronted parties, exert pressure on the leaderships, 
identify resources that may help resolve conflicts, establish networks and information 
exchanges, help deconstruct stereotypes and transform these into public acts of 
healing, and participate in reconciliation and social reconstruction efforts.
127 Radio 
stations can broadcast open debates and public discussions on issues relating to the 
conflict and its resolution and to work on reducing prejudices between the parties.
128 
In the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, the participation of the Georgian and Abkhaz media 
in conflict resolution efforts is hardly possible, in so far as these bodies are 
institutionally weak, financially unstable, and often the quality of journalism is very 
poor. Besides CSO activities do not attract press coverage. In Abkhazia in particular, 
Abkhaz activists often do not publicize their activities, fearing internal recriminations 
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for meeting and negotiating with their Georgian counterparts. Generally civil society 
actors from both sides participating in bi-communal activities risk being accused of 
treason and consequently their meetings and activities have no discernible macro 
impact. There are practically no channels for information exchange between the 
conflict parties. Only Apsnypress (Abkhazia), the Black Sea Press and the Kavkaz 
Press in Georgia cooperate with each other.
129 The mass media in Abkhazia is 
subsidized by the state, allowing the latter to control this sector. The news agency 
“Apsnypress”, newspapers “Respublika Abkhazia” and “Apsni” are controlled by the 
state with editors being appointed by the ruling class. However there are some 
journalists who participate in bilateral meetings, trainings and seminars with their 
Georgian counterparts. Civil society activists in Abkhazia publish the journal 
‘Abkhazia: Grajdanskaia Obshestvo (Abkhazia: Civil Society)’. Also Chegemskaya 
Pravda can be considered as an independent newspaper in Abkhazia. There is also a 
radio programme ‘No Peace, No War’ on post-war life in the Abkhaz and Georgian 
communities.  Radio Soma in Abkhazia produced 8 documentary programmes on 
contemporary issues in Abkhazia. Studio Re and AGTRK produced three films: a 
Georgian journalist in Abkhazia filmed “Abkhazia – a side in the conflict”, an Abkhaz 
journalist in Georgia – “Expectations”, and “Nagorny Karabakh” was filmed by a 
joint team in Baku, Yerevan and Stepanakert. Studio Re was active also in the creation 
of the TV-Programmes “Chechnya, Abkhazia, Georgia”, “Diversified Opinions” on 
the civil war in Georgia and “UNOMIG (United Nations Observer Mission in 
Georgia) in Georgia”.
130 The online media is less developed and Russian television is 
the dominant source of information in Abkhazia. In Sukhumi the newly-established 
Russian-sponsored NGO produces the newspaper Forum which represents the views 
of the opposition, i.e., those close to former president Arzinba.
131 On a whole, the 
media in Abkhazia plays a limited positive influence on conflict resolution efforts. On 
the one hand, the control of the authorities explains why emphasis is regularly placed 
on positive internal developments.
132 On the other hand, Abkhaz society, while fully 
aware of its political, economic and social ills, fear internal destabilization,
133 thus 
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remaining passive or sceptical vis-à-vis the usefulness of citizens diplomacy.
134 Both 
societies are furthermore entrenched in their positions viewing reconciliation almost 
impossible.
135 However a campaign – “Sorry”/ “Hatamzait” launched by ‘Human 
Rights in Georgia’ (a Tbilisi-based NGO) was very important in engendering trust 
between the parties. The main messages of this initiative included admitting and 
apologizing for past wrongs during the war and deconstructing enemy images.
136  
 
3.2. CSOs involvement in the Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh/Armenia conflict 
 
Following 70 years of Soviet rule, Azerbaijan does not have a long tradition of 
democracy and civil society. In the Soviet period all social organizations were 
strongly controlled by official structures. Unlike Georgia, in Azerbaijan most of the 
population continues to view the state as the main defender of public interests and 
society acts like a passive observer of socio-political processes.
137 Hence the 
underdevelopment of the CSO sector in Azerbaijan. Furthermore, state structures 
hinder the development of Azeri civil society. This said there are approximately 2,100 
registered NGOs, although only a much smaller number are operational.
138 Most of 
these organizations work on IDPs, human rights, gender, healthcare, peace, and 
environment-related issues. NGOs in Azerbaijan are polarized: some are clearly pro-
governmental and have links with official structures, others are on the opposition. In 
general, the third sector is led by Soviet-era elites,
139 and often these organizations 
suffer from paternalism, nepotism, hierarchy, corruption and lack of transparency and 
accountability.
140 Local financial support to this sector is limited and CSOs are thus 
dependent on foreign funds.  
 
The most influential CSOs in Azerbaijan are the Chief Spiritual Board of Caucasian 
Moslems and the Movement for the Liberation of the Occupied Territories. These two 
organizations enjoy widespread support from governmental structures hindering their 
independence. There is also the National Forum of NGOs, supported by the UNDP, 
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which coordinates NGO activities and consolidates their efforts in Azerbaijan. No 
political NGO, art organizations or sport association is assisted and encouraged by the 
Azeri government. In Armenia, according to the Ministry of Justice there are 3,964 
registered NGOs, one-third of which are active.
141 Foreign foundations and the 
Diaspora are the main sources of funding for most NGOs. Generally Armenian CSOs 
are not directly engaged with conflict-related issues. NGOs such as YERITAC, the 
Civil Society Institute, Solidarity of Students-S.O.S., the Research Centre of Political 
Developments and the Armenian PR Association are mainly active in the field of 
democracy promotion, freedom of speech and mass media, human rights and the rule 
of law.
142 The government has also established government-operated NGOs (i.e., 
GONGOs), while at the same time it has excluded independent organizations from the 
policy-making process. Indeed the increased participation of so-called GONGOs 
(government nongovernmental organizations) in the observation of the parliamentary 
election process was notable.
143 In Nagorno-Karabakh there are about 85 NGOs, 
although the proprtion of active organizations is similar to those of Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. International donors are restricted in their initiatives to finance projects in 
this region for concerns over recognition. There are also no donor supported projects 
in the Armenian occupied territories outside Nagorno-Karabakh. 
 
Generally in Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh functioning NGOs are 
inefficient in achieving their objectives, facing financial as well as technical problems. 
They have limited impact in the promotion of democratic values such as tolerance, 
non-violence, transparency, freedom of the media, in holding the state accountable 
and informing and educating citizens. As in Georgia and Abkhazia, CSOs are often 
concentrated in capital cities and regional NGOs often lack basic infrastructure to 
operate. The political environment is also far from conducive to civil society 
development, in so far as registration procedures is very complicated.  
 
In Azerbaijan civil society has faced several legal restrictions related to both to 
registration and to the protection of rights enshrined in the Constitution and in 
legislative acts. A survey carried out by the OSCE Office in Baku and the ICNL-Baku 
(The International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law) showed that there have been at least 
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600 organizations established in Azerbaijan that never registered. Some have not 
received any final decision or communication from the Ministry of Justice, in other 
cases, the letters of refusal failed to indicate the legal basis for their rejected 
applications.
144 Bureaucracy complicates matters further and in addition CSOs 
(including charities) do not enjoy tax preferences or incentives. The absence of a law 




Azeri organizations working on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict focus on top-level 
actors, paying minor attention to mid- and grassroots-levels. This is in line with the 
regime’s position. The President of Azerbaijan H. Aliyev officially announced that 
‘for as long as we have not signed a peace agreement with Armenia there is no need 
for cooperation between our NGOs and Armenians’. When Kocharian and I resolve 
the issue… then let NGOs reconcile the two peoples’.
146 The position of official Baku 
is also to exclude the Armenian community of Nagorno-Karabakh in the negotiation 
process and concentrate only on Armenia as the occupier of Azeri territory. Only if 
Armenia were to abandon the negotiations would the option of including Nagorno 
Karabakh in negotiations become more realistic.
147 
 
In Azerbaijan the public increasingly favours a military solution to the conflict, and 
this position is also shared by civil society. For instance, the Karabakh Liberation 
Organisation (KLO) (approximately 10,000 members) supports a military solution to 
the conflict and believes that only through military action it is possible to regain the 
occupied territories. On 7 July 2008 the organization published a document: “Unified 
Position to Eliminate Consequences of Armenian Aggression toward Azerbaijan”, 
which declares that ‘peace talks should end and military operations should be 
launched’.
148 Some Azeri NGOs also oppose participation of Karabakh citizens in 
cultural initiatives. For instance, in 2006 Azeri NGOs sent a protest letter to the 
municipal government of the Turkish city of Kars for inviting folk groups from 
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Karabakh to participate in the city’s cultural festival. The Azeri national soccer team 
even refused to host the Armenian team in Baku as part of the European qualification 
games in order not to appear to be cooperating with the Armenian government. The 
visit of the Azeri branch of the Helsinki Citizens Assembly (HCA) to the leadership 
of Nagorno-Karabakh, in the framework of the “Gugark” youth summer camp, caused 
the protest of several Azeri NGOs and the mass media. Some local TV stations even 
accused representatives of the HCA of ‘mis-educating [Azeri] youth’, evidencing how 
public diplomacy and exchange programmes are strongly condemned in Azerbaijan 
and actors involved in these initiatives are viewed as traitors by the wider public.
149 
 
Armenia shares a similarly aggressive view regarding the peace process. In 2007 after 
the visit by Azeri academics and diplomats to Nagorno-Karbakh, about 50 Armenian 
organizations issued an open letter to officials opposing the return of any territory by 
Armenia and declared that ‘any politician or public officer who should openly … 
demonstrate a willingness to surrender Armenian lands, will be regarded a national 
traitor…’
 150 According one of the signatories, S. Martirosiyan, founder of the 
OpenArmenia web portal, ‘three or four years ago, society was really tired of the 
Karabakh issue and wanted to think about the economy, but now people take a more 
radical position and this includes those who were more liberal and tolerant before’.
151 
The Open Society NGO (Nagorno-Karabakh) and the European Integration NGO 
(Armenia) recently discussed parallels between Kosovo and Karabakh and the 
mechanisms to gain recognition based on the Kosovo model. In this respect, they 
offered to establish relations between Karabakh and Kosovo.
152 Pro-peace groups in 
Armenia, mostly supporters of Ter-Petrosian (leader of the opposition party), have 
been marginalized by pro-governmental propaganda.
153  
 
The participation of Azeri CSOs in conflict resolution efforts is rare. There are only 
some initiatives to be mentioned: youth-peace training projects, seminars and 
workshops, conflict resolution trainings for CSO activists, as well as humanitarian 
programmes for IDPs; the UNIFEM (United Nations Development Fund for Women) 
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programme “Women for Peace and Peace-Building” carried out with local NGOs; the 
conflict resolution programme supported by the US and projects by the APEAT 
Centre; the HCA, the Caucasian Refugee and IDP NGO Network, the Transcaucasus 
Women’s Dialogue, the Society of Azerbaijan Women for Peace and Democracy in 
the Caucasus; the “Harmony” women NGO’s initiatives in building negotiating and 
journalism skills. These activities are often criticized by the public.
154 According to 
Arzu Abdullayeva, co-chairman of the Azeri branch of HCA, in Azerbaijan there is 
ongoing repression against peace activists.
155 The IDPs are practically excluded from 
the sphere of civil society activity in view of the widespread belief that governmental 
structures are more effective in providing assistance to them. Nevertheless, some 
NGOs (the Sector of Displaced People of National NGO Forum, the Association of 
Lawyers of Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijan Society for Protection of Rights of Women, 
and NGOs “Hayet” and “Umid”) do provide direct albeit limited social, legal and 
trauma-healing support to refugees.
156  
 
Also Armenian CSOs are not directly engaged in conflict resolution, as they consider 
the conflict to be resolved and Nagorno-Karbakh as liberated.
157 While having been 
involved in peace projects, the Association of Investigative Journalists of Armenia 
uses the term “liberated territories” in its online publications to describe the seven 
regions around Nagorno-Karabakh which are currently under Armenian control, and 
advices the Armenian authorities to repopulate these territories with Armenians.
158 
The organization Cooperation and Democracy deals with the conflicts in the Caucasus 
through the promotion of public debates on conflict-related issues. Individual 
journalists from Novan Tapan Infromation Agency and ApsnyPress have also 
participated in several conflict resolution activities.
159  
 
In Nagorno Karabakh, the most developed NGO is the Helsinki Initiative-92, with its 
main focus on democracy and civil society building. Its activities include also human 
rights and conflict resolution issues, prisoners of war, missing people and refugees. 
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All these issues are dealt with by organizing seminars, workshops and trainings.
160 
The Helsinki Initiative-92 also carried out a project creating a database on missing 
persons from the war. In 1994 and 1995 it organized a meeting with Azeri NGOs, 
bringing ethnic Azeris to Stepanakert. Youth Democracy is another functioning NGO 
in Nagorno-Karabakh, which operates independently from any political movement 
and without any stable sources of finance. This organization is not directly engaged 
with the conflict however and its projects contribute more generally to the 
development of civil society in Karabakh and the promotion of human rights.
161  
 
In general civil society on all sides tends to carry out one-sided projects and is not 
interested in collaboration. One lone exception is the Resource Center of Stepanekert, 
which held a lecture on the role of society in conflict resolution and the importance of 
maintaining contacts with Azerbaijan particularly at non-governmental level. Within 
such a political context, grassroots engagement has been minimal and no real efforts 
have been made to connect the grassroots to the peace process and top-level actors. 
NGOs reach a small segment of the population and consequently public participation 
in conflict resolution is small. In addition, dialogue between CSOs and official 
structures on conflict issues has been restricted and infrequent. Some peace initiatives 
were undertaken by international organizations, including the Norwegian and Danish 
Refugee Councils, the Migration Sector Development project funded by IOM, and 
UNIFEM, which together with regional NGOs organized capacity-building seminars 
and trainings, conducted research studies on conflict-related issues, carried out a 
regional project on “Women for peace and conflict prevention in South Caucasus”, 
and facilitated meetings between Azeri and Armenian journalists.
162 Since 2003 
International Alert together with Catholic Relief Services,  Conciliation Resources, 
International and LINKS have also worked on the Karabakh conflict. Their main 
objectives are the promotion of political dialogue, strengthening civil society, the free 
media and public awareness. In the framework of these initiatives, this consortium has 
attempted to create and expand networks of civic leaders working on conflict 
resolution in order to enhance the role of local communities in the process, and to 
create a long-term strategy to sustain civil society engagement in conflict resolution. 
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To achieve these goals the consortium has held a series of seminars, trainings and 
workshops.
163  Conciliation Resources supports Nagorno-Karabakh’s most widely-
read newspaper Demo and provides an exchange of articles by Azeri and Armenian 
journalists about the conflict and the peace process, published in each country’s 
press.
164 In 2006 Conciliation Resources launched an initiative called Dialogue 
through Film aimed at encouraging dialogue through short films about each parties 
situation.
165 Another initiative is Radio Diaries, which includes 20 radio stations and 
over 40 journalists working in Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. Its main goal is to break-down stereotypes among 
societies.
166 In 2004 the Friedrich Naumann Foundation of Germany, the Yerevan 
Press Club and “Yeni Nesil” organized a roundtable “Armenia-Azerbaijan-Turkey: 
Looking for Reconciliation”, which discussed compromise solutions to regional 
problems. Several meeting were held among Azeri, Armenian, and Nagorno-
Karabakh journalists in the framework of the project “Karabakh conflict in the mirror 
of media and public opinion in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Mountainous Karabakh”, but 
without any concrete results.
167  
 
In Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia there are few research institutes 
working on conflict resolution issues. Research centres concentrate mainly on human 
rights protection, training for target groups, election monitoring, legal assistance and 
consultancy. Yet even in these field their projects are underdeveloped. The most 
alarming fact in the conflict is that research and academia feeds rather than diffuses 
“enemy images” and much time and money is spent “informing” the international 
community about the crimes committed by the other side and the fact that the “other” 
does not have a historical justification to its territorial claims.
168 For example, the 
Armenian research institute Dialogue Center for Culture Study is concerned more 
with historical reconstructions by carrying out a project on the study of monuments of 
Artsakh 4 BC-3 AC rather than with reconciliation efforts.  
 
                                                 
163 See International Alert in the Caucasus: Armenia/Azerbaijan: A Consortium Initiative for the 
Nagorny Karabakh conflict resolution process, (December 2006). 
164 See Conciliation Resources: What we do on the Nagorny Karabakh conflict. 
165 See Conciliation Resources: Breaking down barriers through film. 
166 See Conciliation Resources: South Caucasus Radio Diaries project. 
167 See Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey: The dialogue Continues, (2004). 




The media in all three parties contributes to the dissemination of stereotypes and 
enemy images and rarely focuses on civil society activities. According Freedom 
House, the press in Azerbaijan is “not free”.
169  Bakinskiy rabochiy is pro-
governmental and has the least number of news items related to civil society 
activity.
170 ANS, the leading private Azerbaijani TV and radio company, opens its 
daily news programmes with the words: ‘Armenia’s aggression towards Azerbaijan 
continues’. Pro-governmental media constantly tries to discredit NGO peace activists, 
particularly those who meet with their Armenian counterparts.
171 However, there are 
some NGOs promoting press freedom in Azerbaijan. These include the Press Council 
of Azerbaijan, the journalist association “Eni Nasil” and the Union of Journalists, 
Democratic League of Journalist,  Baku Press Club. These organizations try to 
promote the self-sufficiency of the media, aid media outlets in developing methods to 
collect information from governmental structures, improving their finances and 
following tax regulations. These organizations are also active in monitoring and 
observing journalists’ rights, examining the laws on the media and freedom of speech, 
and press state structures to improve existing legislation in this field. Furthermore, 
newspapers such as Zerkalo and Ganjabasar generally tend to favour the third sector 
and regularly publish information on its activities. In Armenia, the media has no 
access to the official negotiation process and for this reason only official information 
about the meetings are published. Generally the Armenian media avoids providing 
evaluations of such events.
172 According to the representative of the NGO “Helsinki 
Initiative-92” Karen Ohanjanyan there is a lack of independent media in Armenia, no 
sources are able to give complete information about the political situation in the 
country.
173 The Armenian media promotes the belief that the Karabakh conflict is 
over. The mass media in Nagorno-Karabakh is underdeveloped. The population 
watches satellite TV, mainly Armenian, Russian, Azeri, Turkish and Iranian. The 
newsletter Azat Artsakh is pro-government, one of the journalists there admits that 
self-censorship is common in order to avoid provocations and conflicts with the 
authorities.
174 By contrast, Demo, Chto Delat, and Martik are non-governmental, but 
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they reach a very limited audience. KarabakhOpen.com, an online newspaper that 
analyses political, economic conflict-related issues is also operational. However, the 
population of region has little information about developments “on the other side”, not 
least because of the impossibility of travelling directly from Azerbaijan to Nagorno-
Karabakh or Armenia, or even to telephone across the conflict divides.
175 
 
3.3. CSOs involvement in the Moldova/Transnistria conflict 
 
At present in Moldova there are about 3,700 registered NGOs,
176 but only a few have 
the capacity to contribute to public policy and even these often lack credibility within 
society. In addition the legislative and tax frameworks do not encourage external 
foundations to make donations, and discourage CSO registrations. The Moldovan 
government also tends also to use the media in its own interest and discriminates 
against the independent media. All these factors impede CSOs from fully exploiting 
their capabilities. Under these circumstances civil society in Moldova has not become 
a vibrant sector in the country. Civil society in Transnistria remains weak and both the 
activities of local CSOs and of international foundations are severely restricted in 
view of the strict control of the security services. Financial sustainability of Moldavan 
and Transnistrian NGOs remains limited, most are dependent on foreign donors and 
often cannot attract and maintain high levels of professionalism, particularly when 
based outside the capitals. The internal organizational and management structures of 
CSOs is weak, their advocacy capacity is limited and there is no efficient coordination 
between CSOs.  
 
The number of NGOs involved in conflict resolution is difficult to estimate as 
formally registered NGOs in Moldova do not provide any information about their 
activities.
177 There is practically no interaction between Moldavan and Transnistrian 
NGOs, not least because of the tight cap on Transnistrian organizations. In 2006 the 
President of Transnistria issued a decree prohibiting external financing of local NGOs 
that are directly “engaged in political activities”.
178 Besides this both civil societies 
operate within a context in which the local populations are not (in the case of 
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Transnistria) or insufficiently (in the case of Moldova) interested in reconciliation and 
reintegration. According to one survey 62% of Moldovan respondents are ready to 




In general NGOs and research institutes are engaged with projects related to European 
integration and not with conflict resolution issues. In Transnistria there are some 
NGOs working on democracy, social and educational issues, but their activities are 
restricted by isolation, limited resources and scant knowledge of the basic principles 
of the values they promote. However even these NGOs are restricted by government 
in providing legal advice and other forms of assistance. It is practically impossible to 
organize joint meetings, seminars or workshops with Moldovan counterparts. For 
instance, in July 2005 the chairman of the Moldovan Helsinki Committee was attacked 
by pro-government forces when he tried to attend a human rights roundtable in 
Transnistria.
180 Travel to the separatist region is restricted by the authorities. The 
Chisinau-based NGO Promo-Lex stated that its members were stopped several times 
when attempting to enter Transnistria.
181 Despite all these hindrances, some civil 
society activists managed to create NGOs which are registered in both Moldova and 
Transnistria and they have established a bank account in both Chisinau and Tiraspol 
that allows them to apply for foreign grants.
182 The Joint Committee for 
Democratization and Conciliation (JCDC), a local NGO run by activists from both 
the Moldova and Transnistria communities, has undertaken a number of initiatives 
aimed at bridging the gap between the parties. It organized a festival of folk music 
and initiated the "Bridge of Trust" project, a mutual ecological programme for the 
preservation of the Dniestr river. JCDC works particularly on bringing together 
younger generations of the two opposing side, believing it may take another 
generation to find a settlement to the conflict.
183 Another active local NGO is the 
Resource Centre of Moldovan Non-governmental Organizations for Human Rights. In 
2007 the Centre organized a roundtable for 15 NGO leaders from Moldova and 
Transnistri, discussing the lessons learnt from 15 years of civil society work on 
conflict issues as well as visions to transform the conflict and civil society’s 
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contribution to it. The Centre also carries out the Cooperative Peace Project to 




In terms of youth work, the Millennium Institute for Education and Development and 
the Development Center for Transnistria (Promo-Lex Association) have carried out 
several initiatives. They have organized a workshop on “Strategic Planning” to 
strengthen youth on both sides, conducted a seminar on “Civic participation” and 
“Partnerships (NGO, private and governmental sectors)” for youth organizations, 
including both Local Youth Councils and initiative groups from Transnistria.
185 
 
In the early 2000s the Moldovan government exerted pressure on both the state-
owned and independent media. The Moldovan media has also faced economic 
pressures such as high tax burdens.
186 According to US Department of State, the 
government in Moldova continues to control the mass media by distributing broadcast 
licenses. However there are also oppositional newspapers such as Flux, Timpul, 
Jurnal de Chisnau and Zierul de Garda,
187 which criticize state policies and practice 
relatively freely, including also newspapers supporting Transnistrian separatism.
188 
The media coverage of CSO activities is underdeveloped. The media often describes 
civil society actors as donor-driven and money-laundering groups.
189 The National 
Endowment for Democracy (NED) financed the creation of the Centre of Education, 
Information, and Social Analyses. Its bilingual journal Civic Forum is a unique source 
which provides information about civil society development and NGO activities. 
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185 See Resource and Development Center for Transnistria, RDCT Bulletin. 
186 See Freedom House: Nations in Transit – Moldova (2004). 
187 See U.S. Department of State: Country Report on Human Rights and Practices in Moldova. 
188 See Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), The Representative on Freedom 
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189 See Freedom House: Nation in Transit – Moldova (2008). 
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The independent media practically does not exist in Transnistria. Nearly all media 
outlets are state-owned or state-controlled. A state editorial committee, which 
includes the ministers of security, justice, foreign affairs, and information, oversees 
the activities of all print and electronic media. Those who tend to be independent have 
been restricted. The editorial staff of the newspaper The individual and His Rights has 
experienced intimidation and violent attacks. Sometimes official structures have 
confiscated copies of independent newspapers. Under such circumstances journalists 
exercise self-censorship.
191 The promotion of NGO activities through press releases 
and public debates is impossible.  
 
3.4. CSOs involvement in the Western Sahara conflict 
 
CSOs in Morocco and in the occupied territories have played a limited role in the 
conflict resolution process. In Morocco, this has been due mainly to the state’s strict 
control over civil society, but also to the widespread consensus among the Moroccan 
population on the fact that Western Sahara is and should remain an integral part of the 
state’s territory. 
192 In the Western Sahara, NGOs rights of access and movement have 
always been restricted. Nevertheless, Sahrawis have succeeded in establishing an 
active movement for the mobilization of international solidarity with the Sahrawi 
cause and the protection of human rights of the Sahrawi population in the refugee 
camps in Tindouf, in south western Algeria, and abroad.
193  
 
In the Western Sahara, the Western Sahara Resource Watch (WSRW) is a network of 
organizations and activists with members in more than 30 countries, researching and 
campaigning foreign companies working for Moroccan interests in occupied Western 
Sahara. Believing that the occupation of Western Sahara will not end so long as 
Morocco profits from it, WSRW conducts an international campaign to reaffirm the 
sovereignty of the Sahrawi people over their natural resources and to break the link 
between the exploitation of natural resources and the de facto funding of the 
Moroccan occupation. In particular, they ask foreign companies to refrain from 
entering into business deals with Moroccan companies or authorities for investments 
                                                 
191 See Freedom House: Freedom in the World – Transnistria [Moldova] (2007).  
192 See Leenders, R. (2000), Western Sahara: Africa’s last colony, Searching for Peace in Africa.  
193 Ibidem. (2000).  
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in the occupied territories.
194 Another initiative promoted by Sahrawi groups in 21 EU 
member states is the campaign Fish Elsewhere!, which seeks to stop the controversial 
fisheries agreement that the EU negotiated with Morocco, allowing EU vessels to 




Sahrawi human rights associations mainly work in cooperation with groups based in 
Europe, the US and Australia, and carry out an intense campaign within the United 
Nations. A number of these organizations campaign against the violations of human 
rights perpetrated by the Moroccan state in Western Sahara and against Sahrawi 
citizens in Morocco. The Moroccan government systematically refuses to give to 
Sahrawi organizations the permission to operate in the state’s territory: therefore, they 
usually operate illegally, with activists occasionally subject to arrests and harassment, 
while others are mainly active in exile. The Sahrawi Association of Victims of Grave 
Human Rights Violations Committed by the Moroccan State (ASVDH) was created in 
2005 by a coalition of Sahrawi human rights defenders. This association advocates 
justice for the Sahrawi people who have been victims of human rights violations as a 
precondition for a reconciliation and resolution of the Western Sahara conflict. 
ASVDH has been refused recognition by the Moroccan authorities and is thus forced 
to operate illegally in the Moroccan-occupied parts of Western Sahara.
196 The 
Association for the Families of Saharawi Prisoners and the Disappeared 
(AFAPREDESA) was constituted in 1989 in the refugee camps of Tindouf. 
AFAPREDESA has also been banned by the Moroccan government due to its close 
ties with the Polisario Front, but even so it continues working in the occupied territory 
and even within Morocco proper. It participates in the UN Human Rights Council and 
is an observant member for the African Commission of Human Rights.
197 Finally, the 
National Union of Sahrawi Women (NUSW) is a well-established women association, 
which was created in 1979 on the initiative of the Polisario Front and currently 
includes 10,000 female members based in the camps of Tindouf, in the Western 
Sahara and abroad. Its main tasks are the protection of women rights and the 
promotion of their role in Sahrawi society, but also the campaign for the 
                                                 
194 See http://www.wsrw.org/.  
195 See www.fishelsewhere.org.  
196 See ASVDH website: http://asvdh.net/english/?page_id=438.  
197 See AFAPREDESA website: 
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independence of the Western Sahara from Moroccan occupation and the right of self-
determination of the Sahrawi population. At national level, it provides assistance to 
alleviate the suffering of women facing abductions, torture and imprisonment in the 
occupied territories, promotes initiatives for the empowerment of Sahrawi women in 
the social and political fields and mobilizes Sahrawi women to reinforce their role in 
the struggle for the liberation and independence of the Western Sahara. At 
international level, it promotes human rights, gender equality and democracy and 
organizing worldwide support for Sahrawi women and the Sahrawi cause.
198 
 
On the other side, there are several Moroccan NGOs that focus on the fight against 
human rights abuses by the Polisario Front. Their most severe accusations concern the 
imprisonment, killing and the abusive treatment of Moroccan prisoners of war, but 
also the lack of freedom of movement and expression for the population in the 
Tindouf refugee camps. These organizations include, among others, the Moroccan 
Committee for the Regrouping of the Saharan Families (COREFASA), the 
Association of the Moroccan Sahara, the Association of the Parents of Sahrawi 
Victims of Repression in the Tindouf Camps (PASVERTI) and Al Massira 
Association for the defence of the rights of Moroccan prisoners and detained persons 
in the Tindouf camps. Some of these organizations also recently campaigned for the 
inclusion of Moroccans – allegedly of Sahrawi descent – within the list of voters for 
the referendum sponsored by the UN on the status of the Western Sahara.
199 There is 
also an increasing willingness of Morocco’s human rights defenders to cooperate with 
their Sahrawi counterparts and joint initiatives were recently promoted by both former 
Moroccan and Sahrawi disappeared and their families. The Associations Marocaine 
des Droits de l’Homme (AMDH), a Moroccan non-profit human rights NGO founded 
in 1979, has recently taken up Sahrawi cause of human rights violations and works 
closely with Sahrawi human rights activists in calling for the accountability of 
Moroccan government in the Western Sahara.
200 Moreover, several Sahrawi students 
in Morocco actively cooperate with Moroccan human rights organizations, journalists 
and leftist activists.
201 These initiatives continue to be obstructed by the Moroccan 
government. For example, the Sahrawi branch of the Truth and Justice Forum, a 
                                                 
198 For more information, see NUSW website: http://www.arso.org/UNFS-Homepage.htm.  
199 See Leenders, R. (2000), op. cit. 
200 See AMDH website: http://www.amdh.org.ma.  
201 Stephan, M. J. and Mundy, J. (2006), op. cit.  
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Nevertheless, there are still several Sahrawi members in the organization. A 
Moroccan Equity and Reconciliation Committee (IER), the first truth commission in 
the Middle East, was established by royal decree in 2004. At the end of 2005, the IER 
released its final report and submitted it to King Mohamed VI, detailing the contents 
of the commission’s public hearings and investigations into the disappeared in the 
period 1956-1999. However, in a report published by Freedom House in 2006, it 
emerges that ‘the only public hearing scheduled to take place in Western Sahara was 
cancelled and only a tiny fraction of the cases described by witnesses and victims 
related to Western Sahara’.
203  
 
A GONGO initiative worth mentioning is also the Royal Advisory Council for 
Saharan Affairs (CORCAS) has been recently created on the initiative of the 
Moroccan government ‘to seek input from all parties affected by the 30 year old 
political stalemate to find the most effective path towards autonomy for the southern 
provinces within the framework of Morocco’s long-established sovereignty’.
204 
CORCAS is constituted by 140 members, representing ethnic, political and tribal 
groups in Moroccan society, which are all appointed by the King. Notably, the father 
of Polisario leader Mohamed Abdelaziz is a member of CORCAS.
205 This newly-
created body seeks to overcome the stalemate in the negotiations with the Polisario 
Front and the Algerian authorities, which have refused to engage in dialogue with 
CORCAS and deal directly with the Sahrawi people in the occupied territories, in the 
refugee camps in Tindouf and abroad. CORCAS tries to carry out its tasks by relying 
on tribal and family links between Sahrawis to open channels of communication, 




                                                 
202 See the King’s decision, available at http://www.arso.org/docu/acteengl.htm.  
203 See http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/WoW/2006/Morocco2006.pdf.  
204 See CORCAS: a Culture of dialogue and consensus in Morocco, available at 
http://www.moroccanamericanpolicy.com/subject_area.php?sub_id=15.  
205 See CORCAS website: http://www.corcas.com/Default.aspx?alias=www.corcas.com/eng.  
206 See Maouelainin, M. A., CORCAS, (2007),  A vital player in the Western Sahara conflict.   
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Turning to the media, the Moroccan media towards the Western Sahara conflict tends 
to depict the Moroccan proposal of “Substantial Autonomy” for Western Sahara as an 
advanced form of self-determination. The press is largely in line with the government 
position and usually refrains from offering critical analysis on the question. This is 
due both to journalists’ own conviction and self-censorship as well as to government 
censorship. Moroccan official sources usually tone down and depoliticize the Western 
Sahara issue, for example by presenting the activity of separatist groups in the 
“southern provinces” as an extreme consequence of socio-economic problems that 
affect the area.
207 There are a few exceptions to this however. In April 2000, the 
Moroccan journal Le Journal published an interview with Polisario leader Mahumad 
Abdel-Aziz and calling for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The magazine was 
subsequently banned and its editor received stern warnings from the Interior and 
Information Ministries. Moroccan governmental homepages dealing with the Western 
Sahara issue include: the Maghreb Arabe Press (MAP), the news service of the 
Moroccan government, Sahara Marocain.net, a news portal including articles on 
Western Sahara and advocating the territorial integrity of Morocco, Western Sahara 
Online.net, which provides ‘all the information and the facts that the world public 
should know about the Moroccan identity of the Sahara’ with the aim of ‘show[ing] 
the lies and misleading information given by the so-called “Polisario Front” and their 
stalling tactics’, and Speak for Sahrawis.com, reporting the testimonials of Sahrawi 
people oppressed by the Polisario Front. Another GONGO, the Moroccan American 
Center for Policy (MACP) has been established in Washington D.C. on the initiative 
of the King, whose mission is to inform opinion-makers, officials and the interested 
public in the US about political and social developments in Morocco, its foreign 
policy, but also the Western Sahara.
208 Its website headlines include the activities of 
the Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs (CORCAS), development 
programmes undertaken by Morocco to improve the social, economic and security 
environment in Western Sahara, human rights violations in the Tindouf camps and the 
Polisario Front’s obstructions of negotiations for the resolution of the conflict. 
 
On the Sahrawi side, the Sahara Press Service is the multi-lingual press and 
propaganda arm of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, the government in exile of 
                                                 
207 See San Martin, P. (2005), op. cit. 
208 See http://www.moroccanamericanpolicy.com/about_macp.php.   
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Western Sahara. It mainly reports on government-related news and current affairs, 
both from within the territory and the Sahrawi refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria.
209 
The Sahrawi Journalist and Writers Union is also very active in the dissemination of 
information on the Western Sahara from the Sahrawi point of view. This group also 
has a webpage (http://www.upes.org). Internet has been extensively used by Sahrawi 
activists to overcome the strict control and the limitations in their freedom of 
expression and association imposed by the Moroccan government. ARSO 
(Association de Soutien à un Référendum Libre et Régulier au Sahara Occidental) can 
be considered as the official homepage of the international solidarity movement for 
Western Sahara: its website contains information on the Sahrawi population and the 
Western Sahara, including a comprehensive overview of all Western Sahara 
organizations worldwide.
210 There are many documents, pictures and videos posted on 
different websites by Sahrawi activists to denounce abuses and tortures by the 
Moroccan police and to sensitize the public on the Sahrawi cause.
211 The government 
of Morocco has normally reacted by blockading internet access to these sites both in 
Morocco and in Western Sahara. Since November 2005, Morocco began censoring all 
political websites advocating Western Sahara’s independence.
212 Reporters Without 
Borders denounced the decision to block these websites as a serious violation of free 
expression and recommended to use an online proxy such as 
http://www.anonymizer.com to sidestep the filtering. As a reaction to this, the 
government of Morocco added the service to its Internet blacklist.
213 Another English 
homepage made by Sahrawi refugees in the US is “Western Sahara Online”.
214 There 
are also several blogs managed by Sahrawi refugees worldwide that disseminate 
information on the Sahrawi people and its culture, and support the struggle for 
independence.
215 
3.5. CSOs involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
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Conflict resolution in Israel has traditionally been considered the exclusive 
competence of the government and the military, which has retained a monopoly on 
these critical issues at least until the 1970s. Israeli elites were considered as the only 
legitimate actors to deal with peace and war, and the state was organized on the basis 
of centralist and collectivist tendencies. Activities carried out by CSOs were viewed 
as against the state’s interest and as such discouraged, while political parties were the 
only recognized channels for public expression and demands.
216 Open civil discontent 
towards this traditional security thinking erupted in the mid-1970s. During these 
years, the largest right-wing fundamentalist group to date, Gush Emunim (Bloc of the 
Faithful), and the largest peace movement to date, Peace Now, on opposing ends of 
the Zionist camp, were both founded, together with smaller CSOs, in this period.
217 
Both Zionist left- and right-wing groups emerged during the Lebanon War (1982) and 
reached maturity during the first Palestinian Intifada (1987), although the 1991 Gulf 
war diminished their activism.
218 
 
Labour’s 1992 electoral victory and the signing of the Oslo Declaration of Principles 
in 1993 represented a turning point in the attitude of Israeli governments towards the 
peace talks and had significant repercussions on the civil society realm. CSOs on the 
right judged the shift in the government’s strategy as extremely dangerous, joining 
forces with right-wing parties to organise massive anti-Oslo campaigns. At the same 
                                                 
216 See Hermann, T. (2006), op. cit.  
217 Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) was established in 1974: it claims the right to settlement in the 
West Bank, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights as part of Israel. The movement’s mobilizing structures have 
included state-funded religious schools, military units, and both formal and informal social networks. 
Skilful exploitation of available political opportunities, mobilizing structures and ideological framing 
have allowed the movement to implement its programme of settlement within the occupied territories 
in the face of substantial domestic and international opposition. The ensuing radicalization and 
terrorism of members of the movement resulted into violent acts during pivotal phases of the peace 
process such as Camp David, Oslo and Israel’s 2005 unilateral withdrawal from Gaza. (See M. 
Munson, Gush Emunim and the Israeli Settlers of the Occupied Territories: A Social Movement 
Approach, in Strategic Insights, available at 
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2008/Apr/munsonApr08.asp). Peace Now was founded in 1978: it 
claims the right of both Israel and Palestinians to live within secure borders, recognizes the Palestinian 
right of self-determination and advocates the creation of a Palestinian state in the territories occupied as 
a result of the 1967 war.  Peace Now currently operates through public campaigns, advertisements, 
petitions, distribution of educational materials, conferences and lectures, surveys, dialogue groups, 
street activities, vigils and demonstrations. A particularly important ongoing project of Peace Now is its 
Settlement Watch, which monitors and protests against the building of settlements, along with 
studying settler attitudes regarding possible evacuation and compensation.  Shortly after the beginning 
of the second Intifada, the movement was instrumental in the creation of the Israeli Peace Coalition, 
which evolved into the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Coalition, composed of political and public figures as 
well as grassroots activists from both the Israeli and Palestinian mainstream. (See Peace Now website: 
http://www.peacenow.org.il/site/en/homepage.asp). 
218 See Ben-Eliezer, U. (2005). op. cit.   
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time, Israeli settlers continued to expand their settlements in the occupied territories 
and new radical right-wing groups emerged on the scene, such as Women in Green 
and This Is Our Land (Zo Artzenu).
219 After Rabin’s assassination and following the 
victory of Netanyahu’s Likud Party at the 1996 elections, civil society right-wing 
activism however considerably decreased.
220 During those years, CSOs on the Zionist 
as well as anti-Zionist left - often defined as peace camp or peace movement - were 
characterized by a variety of tactics, ranging from humanitarian missions and human 
rights campaigns to more political activities, but their common objective was the 
promotion of a win-win solution for the parties involved in the conflict. They 
recognized the Palestinian right of self-determination and the PLO as the legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people. However, joint activities particularly between 
Zionist peace groups and Israeli Arab CSOs have always been hampered by the fact 
that the former openly identified with the Zionist ideology and never embraced 
pacifist antimilitaristic positions.
221 Even if the principles and efforts of the peace 
movement significantly contributed to the Oslo process, Israeli decision-makers 
refused to give it any credit and relegated it to the margins of negotiations. This 
contributed to the gradual slowdown of the movement between the early 1990s and 
the collapse of the Oslo Accords in the summer of 2000. The decline in the 
movement’s activity was accompanied by other trends: a progressive 
institutionalization of the movement, supported by external donors such as the EU and 
international foundations; the emergence of new groups that were by no means 
grassroots oriented, such as The Jerusalem Link and the Peres Center for Peace,
222 and 
                                                 
219 Women for Israel’s Tomorrow (Women is Green) has been active since late 1993 as a registered 
non-profit organization. Its activities include weekly street theatre and public demonstrations, articles, 
posters, advertisements in newspapers and lectures. It is opposed to a two-state solution and the return 
of land occupied during the Six Day War of 1967, and aggressively supports Israeli settlement of those 
territories, which it proposes should be annexed. (See Women in Green website: 
http://www.womeningreen.org/). The Zo Artzenu movement was established with the aim of opposing 
the Oslo process and mainly operates through aggressive protest activities, including halting traffic 
throughout the entire country. The movement refers to non-violent civil disobedience against any 
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220 See Hermann, T. (2006), op. cit., pp. 45-47. 
221 Ivi, (2006), p. 48. An example of recent activities promoted by Palestinian Arabs in Israel, see The 
National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel, The Future Vision of the 
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222 The Jerusalem Link is the coordinating body of two independent women centers: Bat Shalom - The 
Jerusalem Women's Action Center, located in West Jerusalem, and Merkez al-Quds lal-Nissah - The 
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relevant issues based on international law. (See The Jerusalem Link website:  
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the creation of ad hoc coalitions of peace and human rights groups, such as the Israeli 
Committee against House Demolitions and the Coalition of Women for Peace.
223 
 
The events at the beginning of the 21
st century - especially the failure of the Camp 
David II Summit and the second Intifada, together with the culturalization and 
securitization of relations between the West and “Islam” after 9/11 generated mixed 
reactions among Israeli CSOs.
224 Right-wing groups and settler activists were re-
empowered and reacted both through civil activism and violent acts against 
Palestinians and their properties. In the peace camp instead, the collapse of 
negotiations and the upsurge of violence resulted in a considerable reduction of civil 
activities and external financial support. As a consequence of Palestinian suicide 
bombings in particular, the narrative of political dialogue advocated by the peace 
movement lost public resonance and legitimacy.
225 However, the launch of Prime 
Minister Sharon’s plan of unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip provoked 
strong reactions by right-wing activists, who conducted a campaign to convince Likud 
members to vote against the plan. The much weakened as well as hardened peace 
movement supported Sharon’s plan and staged demonstrations and initiatives to 
counter the activities of settlers and their supporters.
226 Israeli CSOs have always been 
careful not to fully associate themselves with international movements and 
campaigns, fearing that this would cast doubt on their patriotism and loyalty to the 
Israeli-Jewish collectivity.
227 Recent developments in Israeli civil society suggest a 
gradual disengagement of Israeli CSOs from the political sphere and the big questions 
of war and peace, “towards an isolated, separated, apolitical, post-material 
perspective”, locking their activities “into narrow frameworks, communities and even 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.batshalom.org/jlink_about.php). The Peres Center for Peace is an independent, non-profit, 
non-partisan, non-governmental organization founded in 1996 by Shimon Peres. Its peacebuilding 
activities are based on five main pillars: People-to-People Dialogue and Interaction, Capacity-Building 
through Cooperation, Nurturing a Culture of Peace in the Region's Youth, Business and Economic 
Cooperation, Humanitarian Responses. (See The Peres Center for Peace website: http://www.peres-
center.org/).  
223 See Hermann, T. (2006), cit., pp. 49-50. See also the Israeli Committee against House Demolition 
website at http://www.icahd.org/eng/ and the Coalition of Women for Peace website at 
http://coalitionofwomen.org/home/english.  
224 See Ram, U. (2005), Four Perspectives on Civil Society and Post-Zionism in Israel.   
225 See Hermann, T. (2006), cit., p. 52-53. 
226 Ivi, (2006), pp. 52-57. 
227 Ivi, (2006), p. 58.  
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sectors”. This tendency could represent a chronic difficulty for Israeli civil society “to 
serve as a harbinger for peace”.
228 
 
The development of Palestinian civil society has always been influenced by three 
crucial factors: the absence of a sovereign and democratic state in the Palestinian 
territories, the extremely repressive Israeli occupation and the heavy dependence of 
these organizations on foreign funds. All these factors have substantially hindered the 
growth and power of Palestinian civil society, and limited its impact on the resolution 
of the conflict. Nevertheless, Palestinian CSOs have always played a vital role in 
Palestine: they have been an integral part of the Palestinian national movement and its 
aspiration for a free and sovereign Palestine. Moreover, since the 1967 Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, they have performed an important 
function in providing services in the social, educational and medical fields to the 




The Oslo agreements and the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority 
(PNA) represented a major watershed for Palestinian NGOs, forcing them to change 
their strategies and role in order to adapt to the new political and socio-economic 
context. Before the Oslo agreement, Palestinian activists focused on pursuing the 
common goal of ending the Israeli occupation and directed their efforts mainly against 
the Israeli government and army. This unity of intent, aimed more at combating the 
enemy was shattered by the Oslo Accords, although many organizations criticized or 
openly rejected the Oslo track. The advent of the PNA also eroded some of the space 
of civil society while opening new areas of activity. The PNA claimed to be 
representative of the Palestinian voice and struggle, thus competing with the civil 
society sector in its basic raison d’être.
230 At the same time, CSOs were confronted 
with new and complex challenges, such as strengthening the legal system, institution-
building, internal human rights and the rule of law.
231  
 
                                                 
228 See Ben-Eliezer, U. (2005), cit. 
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During the second Intifada, CSOs have continued to function, but focusing 
increasingly on emergency and relief services. Conflict resolution initiatives, by 
contrast, faced a series of new obstacles: some Palestinian CSOs stopped their 
advocacy activities and joint ventures with their Israeli counterparts, others refused 
USAID funding because of the latter’s conditions concerning the support to terrorism, 
while others still opposed tripartite civil society relations 
(European/Palestinian/Israeli) encouraged by the European Commission.
232 At 
present, there are only few conflict resolution organisations that carry out 
peacebuilding activities in Palestine. Among them, we find the Palestinian Center for 
Research and Cultural Dialogue, The Palestinian Center of Alternative Solutions, the 
People’s Campaign for Peace and Democracy and the Children of Abraham. These 
organizations are characterized by a significant divergence of opinions, activities, 
internal structures and financial resources. However, they all share a particular interest 
in human rights, awareness-raising at home and abroad.
233 Civic institutions and 
organizations established and supported by Islamist movements such as Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad also deserve mention. These organizations are opposed to dialogue and 
conflict resolution along the lines of the Oslo framework and have tended to focus on 
the socioeconomic and political needs of the Palestinians.
234 Part of the electoral 
success of Hamas in the 2005 municipal elections and the 2006 parliamentary 
elections can be attributed by the effectiveness of these organizations in providing 
services and spreading their political messages.
235 
 
As far as the international community support for Palestinian civil society is 
concerned, foreign aid has been an essential element for the continuation of the peace 
process over the last two decades. However, the plethora of foreign funded civil 
society projects after the Oslo agreement seems to have contributed to the detachment 
of Palestinian CSOs from the situation on the ground and from the needs of the 
Palestinian population, as these organizations have responded more to the desiderata 
of external donors in terms of both content and management than to needs and 
interests on the ground.
236 Moreover, Palestinian NGOs have also been penalized by 
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the interruptions in external funds during the various phases of the conflict: after the 
substantial boost received from international funds in the run-up to the Oslo process, 
external funds were redirected towards the PNA after its establishment in 1994. More 
recently, following the electoral victory of Hamas in 2006, the Israeli withholding of 
Palestinian tax revenues and international sanctions have limited further funds 
available to Palestinian CSOs. Since the 2007 political split between the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip, international aid has poured back into the West Bank while the 
external siege on the Gaza Strip has deepened.
237 
 
Joint activities between mainstream Palestinian and Israeli CSOs started during the 
first Intifada in 1987: the aim of these initiatives was to establish dialogue and 
contribute to Track II diplomacy. Following the signing of the Oslo agreement, 
international attention towards these joint activities considerably increased and 
hundreds of new initiatives were financed by external donors, with the EU taking the 
lead.
238 These people-to-people (P2P) initiatives were aimed at promoting peace, 
goodwill and understanding between the sides, thus creating the relational 
infrastructure necessary to advance and increase support for the peace process 
negotiated at the political level.
239 These initiatives usually applied the following 
scheme: Israelis, Palestinians and internationals meeting for a limited period of time 
and often in a neutral territory for seminars, discussions, youth camps, workshops, 
training courses etc. with a limited follow-up.
240 However, in the Israeli-Palestinian 
case these initiatives have failed to deliver tangible long-term results due to limited 
funding (approximately USD 26 million between 1993 and 2000), disparities in power 
and resources between Israeli and Palestinian representatives, a lack of political and 
financial support by officials on both sides, scarce involvement of the grassroots, 
language limitations (i.e., activities being restricted to English-speakers), and a lack of 
media attention and public exposure.
241 The eruption of the second Intifada harmed 
significantly the extensive web of joint activities created between 1993 and 2000. 
Some joint Israeli-Palestinian NGOs have endured however, although their impact has 
                                                 
237 See Simoni, M. (2006), op. cit.  
238 See Dajani M., Baskin, G. (2006), Israeli-Palestinian Joint Activities: Problematic Endeavor, but 
Necessary Challenge, p. 87. In 1998 the EU formalised a budget line for the P2P as part of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, while in 2000 the US Department of State established the ‘Wye River 
People-to-People Exchange Program’. 
239 Ivi, (2006), p. 88. 
240 See Simoni, M. (2008), cit. 
241 See Dajani M., Baskin, G. (2006), cit., pp. 95-100.  
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been negligible due to their limited size and budget, their operational difficulties and 
their location outside the mainstreams.
242    
 
At present, there are fourteen joint NGOs operating through research, education, 
advocacy and action in the fields of public policy, economics, social justice, 
environment, human rights, culture, women rights and youth.
243 Two joint initiatives 
have been recently launched as the result of unofficial, joint Israeli-Palestinian efforts: 
the People’s Voice Project of Ami Ayalon and Sari Nusseibeh, and the Geneva 
Initiative. The People’s Voice Project aims at collecting hundreds of thousands of 
Israeli and Palestinian signatories for a statement of principles outlining a two-state 
solution.
244 The final objective is to mobilize public support to create both the 
legitimacy and the pressure on policy-makers to negotiate such an agreement. 
However, the initiative has gained little media attention and the collection of 
signatories has progressively slowed down, thus failing to achieve a discernible 
impact on the political establishments.
245 The Geneva Initiative takes the form of a 
draft of a permanent status agreement, which spells out in great detail the terms of key 
issues such as borders, Jerusalem, refugees, security and monitoring arrangements.
246 
The text was negotiated over a period of nearly three years by a diverse group of 
Israelis and Palestinians, including Israeli military, political, academic and literary 
figures and Palestinian political figures, community activists and civil society leaders, 
with facilitation by Swiss governmental and non-governmental agencies.
247 Even if 
the initiative has received wide attention in the Middle East and beyond, the reaction 
of the media and politicians in the region has been mixed and its effectiveness is 
unclear. 
                                                 
242 See Simoni, M. (2008), cit. 
243 Joint Israeli-Palestinian NGOs include: Alternative Information Service 
(http://www.alternativenews.org), Coalition of Women for a Just Peace 
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http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/ayalon.html.  
245 See Kelman, H. C. (2005), Interactive Problem Solving in the Israeli/Palestinian Case, p. 20.  
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Turning to research, several Political Science and International Relations Departments 
in Israeli universities conduct research and study programmes on peace and conflict 
resolution, with a particular focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Moreover, within 
these departments several research institutes and think tanks have been established, 
offering research, publications, training courses, seminars and workshops on the same 
topics. On the right-end of the spectrum we find the Programme on Conflict 
Resolution at the Bar-Ilan University Department of Political Studies, established in 
1997 and offering an interdisciplinary programme in Conflict Management and 
Negotiation to a community of scholars that work together to develop and expand the 
role of ADR (Alternative Dispute Resolution), mediation, and conflict 
management.
248 Affiliated to this Department at Bar-Ilan University, the Begin-Sadat 
Center for Strategic Studies (BESA), established in 1993, works on security and 
conflict management in the Middle East by conducting policy-relevant research on 
“strategic” subjects, particularly as they relate to Israel’s national security and foreign 
policy.
249 Moving to the centre and centre-left, the Hebrew University Department of 
International Relations of the Hebrew University also conducts research and teaching 
activities dealing with issues of war, peace, and strategy, and in the context of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, research related to Israel, the Jewish people, and the region.
250 
Within the Hebrew University, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the 
Advancement of Peace was founded in 1965 with the support of former US President 
Harry S. Truman. Its activities include studies on Middle East issues, with an 
emphasis on Israeli-Palestinian relations, promoting and enhancing peace, cooperation 
and welfare in the region. Joint Arab-Jewish research projects are particularly 
encouraged.
251 The Tel Aviv University Department of Political Science offers a 
masters degree in diplomacy and security and hosts several research institutes such as 
The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, The Curiel Center for International Affairs 
and The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research.
252 The Jewish-Arab Center for 
Peace at the Givat Haviva Institute, established in 1963 to bring Jews and Arabs in 
                                                 
248 See Bar-Ilan University Department of Political Studies at 
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249 See Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA) at  http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/.  
250 See Hebrew University Department of International Relations at 
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Israel closer and to educate them into mutual understanding and partnership, is also 
particularly active. The Center develops formal and informal programmes to bridge 
the gaps in the fields of Jewish-Arab relations and promote greater understanding 




Palestinian university programmes and departments dedicated to peace and war 
studies are more limited. There are, however, different policy-oriented research 
institutions involved in these fields. The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey 
Research is an independent, non-profit research institute and think tank for policy 
analysis, opinion polling and academic research established in 2000. Its Strategic 
Analysis Unit analyses Palestinian-Israeli relations, including security relations, future 
political and economic relations, psychological impediments to peace, the 
implementation of peace agreements, and mutual challenges and problems facing the 
two societies. There is also a programme on Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, which 
involves background research, policy analysis, and meetings with academics, policy-
makers, experts, parliamentarians, and leaders of political factions examining final 
status issues.
254 The Palestinian Center for Research and Cultural Dialogue was 
established in 2003 by a group of Palestinian academics. It promotes dialogue 
between cultures and religions as a way to bridge the gap between nations and create 
mutual acceptance between parties in conflict in the Middle East. Palestinian 
youngsters between 17 and 23 are educated and trained to become peaceful and 
democratic leaders of a future Palestinian state. It also conducts public opinion 
surveys, focusing mostly on the Palestinian population. The Palestinian Academic 
Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) is an independent non-profit 
institution located in Jerusalem. It seeks to present the Palestinian Question in its 
national, Arab and international contexts through academic research, dialogue and 
publications. PASSIA’s projects include seminars, training for Palestinian graduates 
in international affairs and workshops on the question of Jerusalem.
255 
 
Turning to the media, it is widely believed that modern wars are fought as much on 
TV screens and in the media as they are on the ground. This is very much the case of 
                                                 
253 See Jewish-Arab Center for Peace at Givat Haviva Institute at http://www.givathaviva.org/Page/31.  
254 See Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research at 
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the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Both the Israelis and the Palestinians complain that 
media coverage is biased in favour of the other side, and an impressive number of 
watchdog groups have been created to monitor the reporting in newspapers, TV and 
on the internet, both in Israel, Palestine and abroad.
256 Israel’s most important 
newspapers are Ma’ariv, Yediot Ahronot and Ha’aretz, and its two major television 
stations are Channel 1 and Channel 2. As for Palestine, the three major dailies are Al-
Quds, Al-Ayyam and Al Hayat Al-Jadida, while the major broadcast news media is 
the radio emission Voice of Palestine. Films and documentaries have also become 
important vehicles of the expression of different views on the conflict and have played 
a vital role in challenging stereotyped media images of the conflict.
257 The lack of 
media exposure of CSOs activities has been considered as one of the main causes of 
limited civil society impact. This is mainly due to the scarce interest of the media in 
positive news and peace news, while conflict news is privileged. However, it can be 
linked also to the tendency of organizers to host meetings in a media-free closed-
doors environment in order to stimulate dialogue between the parties and prevent 
obstructionist actions against these initiatives and their promoters (such in the case of 
P2P activities).  
 
Media reporting on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is subject to severe hardships. 
According to Freedom House, both Israel and the PNA severely restrict press freedom 
and often impede journalists’ ability to report safely and accurately on events in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip. Journalists reporting from the occupied territories are 
required to carry Israeli-issued press cards: for Palestinian and Arab journalists, these 
cards are very difficult to obtain.
258 A report by the International Press Institute 
covering the period from the beginning of the Al-Aqsa intifada in 2000 until 2004 
denounced twelve journalist deaths, at least 478 press freedom violations carried out 
by Israeli authorities and another 29 violations carried out by Palestinian 
                                                 
256 They include pro-Israel watchdog groups - Accuracy in the Media, BBC Watch,  Beyond Images, 
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259 Israel’s army and security services continued to commit a range of press 
abuses in 2005 and 2006. Journalists were subject to gunfire, physical abuse, arrest, 
and substantial limits on their freedom of movement. The Palestinian media has also 
faced pressures from the PNA: threats, arrests and abuses of journalists considered 
critical of the PNA, Fateh and, more recently, Hamas, have become routine.
260 In its 
2007 world press freedom ranking, Reporters Without Borders ranked the 
internationally recognized Israel (within its pre-1967 borders) in 44th place. The PNA 
came 158
th place out of 169 countries and territories in the world. Israel in the 




4. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
After the collapse of Soviet Union civil societies in the New Independent Countries 
had little chances to emerge. The trends in their developments are similar. Civil 
societies in the recognized states are more advanced than those in the de facto 
republics. Georgian civil society has made some progress: it is relatively independent 
from government and therefore can formulate its own opinion on various issues. Civil 
society in Abkhazia instead is less open and more dependent on officials.
262 On both 
sides, the level of civil society involvement in policy-making is low, and this is 
particularly true of organizations outside capital cities. In general Georgian and 
Abkhaz civil societies are not enough strong to influence how the conflict could be 
resolved and while assisting the peace process but are unlikely to trigger a 
breakthrough. There is also a lack of coordination between the Georgian and Abkhaz 
civil society sectors, a problem exacerbated by the asymmetries between the two sides 
in terms of levels of experience, availability of resources, degree of professionalism, 
and levels of civil society development in general. The problem of cooperation and 
coordination is also caused by the way in which historical memories have been 
reconstructed on both sides, and, less so, barriers created by language (although 
Russian remains the lingua franca between the two sides).
263 Georgian and Abkhaz 
                                                 
259 See ISRAEL/PALESTINE: Press Freedom Violations in Israel and Palestine from 29 September 
2000 to 28 September 2004 (Issued on September 2004).  
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CSOs have also failed to bridge the gap between top and grassroots level as 
elaborated by John Paul Laderach in so far as the grassroots have remained 
marginalized. In other words, conflict settlement and resolution appears to remain 
firmly in the hands of official actors with civil societies playing a supporting and 
reactive role.  
 
More than 15 years of war talk by official structures and even mid-level actors in 
Azerbaijan and Armenia makes conflict settlement impossible. There are a certain 
societal beliefs, imaginations, and interpretations around collective memories of 
confronted parties that are unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. It is difficult to 
imagine that the future of the Nagorno-Karbakh conflict will be decided in 
Stepanakert, as the decision-making power lies in the hands of the Azeri and 
Armenian authorities. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is considered “intractable”. 
Some of the reasons for this are the lack of public diplomacy and contacts between the 
confronted parties, NGOs and media activists, as well as the lack of media coverage 
of the other side’s positions and the enhancement of an enemy image through 
stereotyping. All this leads to a general feeling of distrust in public diplomacy, 
feelings of victimization and unwillingness to compromise.
264 Conflict parties have 
adopted a ‘wait and see’ approach. Within this context, civil society in Azerbaijan, 
Nagorno-Karbakh and Armenia has practically no impact on conflict resolution. The 
general political context continues to be a significant barrier to a major development 
of the third sector in all recognized and de facto states, where civil society is still not 
an important actor in the policy-making process and in society writ large. The impact 
of CSOs in educating citizens and empowering them to defend their rights has been 
limited. Local NGOs have carried out some projects on public awareness, community 
development, empowerment, conflict resolution, youth work, etc, but many of these 
activities have not yielded substantial results. Academia has tended to prove its side’s 
historical or territorial claims, while focusing less on policy-oriented studies, joint 
research-projects as well as debates and conferences on conflict resolution issues.
265 
Likewise, the media in all three parties has not contributed to breaking down 
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stereotypes between confronted parties. The Armenian media is still talking about 
“genetic incompatibility” of these peoples.
266 
 
The general trend of civil society development in Moldova follows a similar trajectory 
as in other post-Soviet countries. Civic activism and political participation is limited, 
even if the government now tries to involve the third sector in decision-making and 
their level of cooperation has increased. With the eruption of the conflict, civil society 
in Transnistria has had no possibility to emerge. Existing CSOs are restricted in their 
activities and the leadership keeps this sector under close surveillance. The actors in 
second-track diplomacy have been unable to resolve the Moldavan/Transnistrian 
conflict. The activities undertaken by local civil society organizations have been 
insignificant with little impact on conflict resolution. This has been due to several 
factors includine authoritarianism in Transnistria, limited citizen participation in the 
peace- and policy-making in Moldova; foreign funding to NGOs in Transnistria is 
prohibited, the lack of experience and professionalism of activists in peacebuilding 
efforts, the absence of communication and information exchange, the passivity of the 
media in covering CSO initiatives, and the scarcity of open discussion about the 
conflict.    
 
The role of both Moroccan and Sahrawi civil societies towards the resolution of the 
Western Sahara conflict has been very limited. This is firstly due to the fact that 
negotiations have been monopolized by the Moroccan government and the Polisario 
Front, with Algeria acting as an observer in the process. Civil society in Morocco has 
often been instrumental to pursuing the government’s goals on the Western Sahara, 
while opposition stances by Moroccan CSOs and the media have been repressed. 
Embryonic civil society in the occupied territories suffers from heavy restrictions 
imposed on the freedom of access, movement, association and expression. 
Nevertheless, CSOs have succeeded in mobilizing international support for the 
Sahrawi cause through activities and denouncements against Moroccan economic 
exploitation of the occupied territories and human rights abuses against the 
population. There have been few joint Moroccan-Sahrawi initiatives to promote 
mutual understanding and rapprochement promoted by human rights activists, but 
these have been constantly obstructed by the Moroccan government. 
                                                 




In the Middle East, Israel CSOs have not had direct influence on specific policies in 
peacemaking. Palestinian CSOs have proved effective in responding to people’s basic 
needs, but have been a product of the conflict (and peace process) system, failing to 
transcend it.
267 CSO activities both in Israel and Palestine have been more reactive 
than proactive in relation to the major turning points in the conflict. However, civil 
society action has been quite successful in laying the groundwork for cognitive 
changes and introducing new options for the resolution of the conflict.
268 This is true 
also of joint Israeli-Palestinian activities, even if their effectiveness has been limited 
by the lack of financial and political support, inequality among the actors involved, 
and lack of media exposure. In some cases, activities carried out by conservative and 
radical groups in both Israel and the Palestinian territories actually contributed to the 




Problems facing civil society are similar across all five cases. Preliminary 
recommendations for the further development of this sector could include:  
-  Local civil society organizations could concentrate on the involvement of wider 
sectors of society in social and political changes, thus actively promoting the 
values of democracy to be learnt and experienced on the ground. 
-  CSOs could strengthen their “watchdog” and evaluation functions on issues such 
as democratization, human rights protection, conflict resolution, corruption, and 
transparency. The dialogue between the government and civil society must be 
intensified. This goal requires an increase in the monitoring capacity and policy 
analysis skills.  
-  CSOs could work closely with official structures to improve the legislative 
framework that affects their activities, as well as local legislation to promote 
greater public participation in local decision-making. 
-  Dialogue between the mid-range actors should concentrate on less sensitive 
frameworks and not on status issues in order to foster confidence building and 
progress on the ground. CSOs could also promote dialogue on issues of common 
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interest, such as economic development, the environment, cultural matters. The 
civil societies in the non-recognizes entities would especially benefit from these 
initiatives in view of their state of international isolation.   
-  CSOs could establish local forums for dialogue and problem-solving, 
community meetings and develop problem-solving methods, as well as organize 
activities and trainings in schools to promote tolerance and cross-cultural 
understanding.
269 The establishment of mutual contacts between confronted 
societies is essential for confidence-building. This would stimulate public 
involvement (particularly of marginalized groups) in the peace processes.  
-  Education via schools, the media, and community organizations could be 
oriented more on reducing existing prejudices between the parties, emphasizing 
common characteristics. Youth in all separatist regions lacks information not 
only about the peace process, but also of the wider world. Therefore the creation 
of youth peacebuilding activities, summer schools and peace centres, and the 
encouragement of joint academic projects among young scholars would be 
desirable. 
-  Greater self-evaluations regarding the effectiveness of CSO contributions to 
public debate and conflict resolution would be desirable. They must regularly 
produce documents and statements about the problems they have identified and 
publicize and disseminate the results of their researches. 
-  CSOs could establish regular contacts and exchanges with grassroots groups in 
order to keep in touch with the needs of people and channel their requests and 
views to the attention of policy-makers. 
-  Greater ties between CSOs and the media could be cultivated. In particular, the 
local media, as an important part of civil society, must deal more with the 
development of a civic culture and overcome the negative impression that the 
general public has of NGOs. 
-  The mass media must refrain from militaristic rhetoric and minimize enemy-
making rhetoric and preparing societies for compromise. By contrast it could 
pay more attention to positive examples of peacebuilding initiatives. Language 
used in the media must be conflict-sensitive. 
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The South Caucasus Network of NGOs of Refugees/IDPs “Ojakh” 
(Georgia) 
Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development 
(CIPDD), (Georgia) 
Studio Re (Georgia) 
Human Rights in Georgia  International Centre on Conflict and Negotiation (ICCN), 
(Georgia) 
Apsnypress (Abkhazia) 
Cultural and Humanitarian Fund “Sukhumi” (Georgia)  Partners-Georgia, (Georgia)  Black Sea Press (Georgia) 




UMCOR Youth House in Sokhumi (Abkhazia)  Center for Development of a Civil Society (Abkhazia)  Respublika Abkhazia  
Assist Yourself - Association of IDPs from Abkhazia (Georgia)  Civic Initiative Foundation (Abkhazia)  Kavkaz Press (Georgia) 
Association of Displaced Women from Abkhazia (Georgia)  Radio Soma (Abkhazia) 
Civic Initiative – Man of Future Foundation (Georgia)  Forum 
Samursakan (Abkhazia)  Chegemskaya Pravda 
(Abkhazia)  Daily Human Rights Youth Club (Abkhazia) 





































The International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law (ICCNL-Baku), 
(Azebaijan) 
Resource Center of Stepanekert (Nagorno-Karabakh) OpenArmenia 
Karabakh Liberation Organisation (KLO), (Azerbaijan)  Dialogue Center for Culture Study (Armenia)  Novan Tapan Infromation 
Agency (Armenia) 
Helsinki Citizens Assembly (HCA, Azeri branch)  Yerevan Press Club (Armenia) 
The Open Society NGO (Nagorno-Karabakh)  Bakinskiy rabochiy (Azerbaijan) 
European Integration NGO (Armenia)  Baku Press Club (Azerbaijan) 
Transcaucasus Women’s Dialogue (Azerbaijan)  Zerkalo (Azerbaijan) 
Society of Azerbaijan Women for Peace and Democracy in the 
Caucasus (Azerbaijan) 
Ganjabasar (Azerbaijan) 
“Harmony” women NGO (Azerbaijan)  Azat Artsakh (Nagorno-
Karabakh) 
Association of Lawyers of Azerbaijan  Demo (Nagorno-Karabakh) 
Azerbaijan Society for Protection of Rights of Women  Chto Delat (Nagorno-Karabakh) 
“Hayet” (Azerbaijan)  Martik (Nagorno-Karabakh) 
“Umid” (Azerbaijan)  KarabakhOpen.com (Nagorno-
Karabakh)  Association of Investigative Journalists of Armenia 
Helsinki Initiative-92 (Nagorno-Karabakh) 
Youth Democracy (Nagorno-Karabakh) 
Press Council of Azerbaijan 
Journalist Association “Eni Nasil” (Azerbaijan) 
























  Moldovan Helsinki Committee (Moldova)  Centre of Education, Information, and Social Analyses 
(Moldova) 
Flux (Moldova) 
Resource Centre of Moldovan Non-governmental Organizations for 
Human Rights (Moldova) 
The individual and His Rights 
(Transnistria) 
Joint Committee for Democratization and Conciliation (JCDC), 
(Moldova/Transnistria) 
Jurnal de Chisnau (Moldova) 
Promo-Lex (Moldova)  Zierul de Garda (Moldova) 
Millennium Institute for Education and Development (Moldova) 
Development Center for Transnistria (Promo-Lex Association)  Timpul (Moldova) 
























Sahrawi Association of Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations 
Committed by the Moroccan State (ASVDH), (Western Sahara) 
Moroccan American Center for Policy (MACP), (Morocco)  Sahara Press Service (Western 
sahara) 
 
Association for the Families of Saharawi Prisoners and the 
Disappeared (AFAPREDESA), (Western Sahara) 
Maghreb Arabe Press (MAP), 
(Marocco) 
National Union of Sahrawi Women (NUSW), (Western Sahara)  Western Sahara Online (Western 
sahara) 
Moroccan Committee for the Regrouping of the Saharan Families 
(COREFASA), (Morocco) 
Le Journal (Marocco) 
Association of the Moroccan Sahara, (Morocco)  Arabe Press (MAP), (Marocco) 
Association of the Parents of Sahrawi Victims of Repression in the 
Tindouf Camps (PASVERTI), (Morocco) 
Al Massira Association for the defence of the rights of Moroccan 
prisoners and detained persons in the Tindouf camps (Morocco) 
Associations Marocaine des Droits de l’Homme (AMDH), 
(Morocco) 
Truth and Justice Forum (Morocco) 
Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs (CORCAS), (Morocco) 
Sahrawi Journalist and Writers Union  (Western Sahara) 
Association de Soutien à un Référendum Libre et Régulier au Sahara 
Occidental (ARSO), (Western Sahara) 
Western Sahara Resource Watch (WSRW), (Western Sahara) 


















  Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful), (Israeli)  Bar-Ilan University Department of Political Studies (Israeli) 
 
Ma’ariv, Yediot Ahronot and 
Ha’aretz (Israeli) 
Peace Now (Israeli)  Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA), (Israeli)  Channel 1 and Channel 2 
(Israeli) 
Women in Green (Israeli)  Hebrew University Department of International Relations 
(Israeli) 
Al-Quds, Al-Ayyam and Al 
Hayat Al-Jadida (Palestine)  
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This Is Our Land (Zo Artzenu), (Israeli)  Harry S.Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of 
Peace (Israeli) 
The Jerusalem Link (Israeli)  Tel Aviv University Department of Political Science, (Israeli) 
Peres Center for Peace (Israeli)  Jewish-Arab Center for Peace at Givat Haviva Institute, 
(Israeli) 
Israeli Committee against House Demolitions (Israeli)  Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research 
(Palestine) 
Coalition of Women for Peace (Israeli)  Palestinian Center for Research and Cultural Dialogue 
(Palestine) 
Palestinian Center for Research and Cultural Dialogue (Palestine)  Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International 
Affairs (PASSIA), (Palestine)  The Palestinian Center of Alternative Solutions (Palestine) 
People’s Campaign for Peace and Democracy (Palestine) 
Children of Abraham (Palestine) 
Alternative Information Service  
Coalition of Women for a Just Peace (Joint Israeli/Palestine) 
Crossing Borders (Joint Israeli/Palestine) 
The Economic Cooperation Foundation (Joint Israeli/Palestine) 
The Families Forum-The Parents’ Circle (Joint Israeli/Palestine) 
Friends of the Earth Middle East (Joint Israeli/Palestine) 
The Friendship Village (Joint Israeli/Palestine) 
Israeli/Palestinian Centre for Research and Information (Joint 
Israeli/Palestine) 
Israeli-Palestinian Peace Coalition (Joint Israeli/Palestine) 
MidEast Web for Coexistence (Joint Israeli/Palestine) 
Neve Shalom-Wahat al_Salam (Joint Israeli/Palestine) 
One Voice (Joint Israeli/Palestine) 
Re’ut Sadaka (Joint Israeli/Palestine) 





ADR      Alternative  Dispute  Resolution 
AFAPREDESA  Association for the Families of Saharawi Prisoners and the Disappeared  
AMDH     Associations Marocaine des Droits de l’Homme  
ASVDH  Sahrawi Association of Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations 
Committed by the Moroccan State  
BESA    Begin-Sadat  Center for Strategic Studies  
CIPDD    Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development 
CIS    Commonwealth  of Independent States 
CONGO    Government-operated Non-governmental Organization 
CORCAS    Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs  
COREFASA    Moroccan Committee for the Regrouping of the Saharan Families  
CRS    Catholic  Relief  Service 
CSO    Civil  Society  Organisations 
HCA    Helsinki  Citizens  Assembly 
IA    International  Alert 
ICCN    International  Center on Conflict and Negotiation 
ICNL      International Center for Not-for-Profit Law 
IDP    Internally  Displaced  Person 
IER      Moroccan Equity and Reconciliation Committee  
INGO    International  Non-governmental Organization 
JCDC      Joint Committee for Democratization and Conciliation 
KGB     Russian abbreviation of Committee for State Security   
KLO    Karabakh  Liberation  Organization 
MACP     Moroccan American Center for Policy  
MAP    Maghreb  Arabe  Press   
NED      National Endowment for Democracy  
NGO    Non-governmental  Organization 
NUSW       National Union of Sahrawi Women  
OAU      Organisation of Africa Unity  
P2P    People-to-people   
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